

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 52122/52123

STATE OF IDAHO,	)
	) <b>Filed: December 4, 2025</b>
Plaintiff-Respondent,	)
	) <b>Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk</b>
v.	)
	) <b>THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED</b>
AMANDA KAY MARCHANT,	) <b>OPINION AND SHALL NOT</b>
	) <b>BE CITED AS AUTHORITY</b>
Defendant-Appellant.	)
_____	)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Steven J. Hippler, District Judge.

Order revoking probation, affirmed; judgment of conviction and unified sentence of five years with one and one-half years determinate for grand theft, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kierra W. Mai, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

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Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; HUSKEY, Judge;  
and LORELLO, Judge  
\_\_\_\_\_

PER CURIAM

In these consolidated appeals, Amanda Kay Marchant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c) (Docket No. 52122). In exchange for her guilty plea, additional charges were dismissed. The district court sentenced Marchant to a unified term of five years with two years determinate and retained jurisdiction. Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the sentence and placed Marchant on probation for a period of five years.

In Docket No. 52123, Marchant pled guilty to grand theft, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1)(b). In exchange for her guilty plea, additional charges were dismissed. Subsequently,

Marchant admitted to violating the terms of the probation in Docket No. 52122, and the district court consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original sentence. In Docket No. 52123, the district court sentenced Marchant to a unified term of five years and one and one-half years determinate. Marchant appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation in Docket No. 52122, and that the sentence in Docket No. 52123 is excessive.

It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; *State v. Beckett*, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); *State v. Adams*, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); *State v. Hass*, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. *State v. Upton*, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; *Hass*, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; *State v. Marks*, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. I.C. § 19-2601(4). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation. *State v. Morgan*, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. *Id.*

Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. See *State v. Hernandez*, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); *State v. Lopez*, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); *State v. Toohill*, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. *State v. Oliver*, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could

reach the same conclusion as the district court. *State v. Biggs*, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150, 154 (Ct. App. 2020).

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. *State v. Hanington*, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. *Id.* Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record on appeal. *Morgan*, 153 Idaho at 621, 288 P.3d at 838.

Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering execution of Marchant's sentence in Docket No. 52122 or in imposing sentence in Docket No. 52123. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing execution of Marchant's sentence and her judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.