IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 51929/51930

STATE OF IDAHO,)
) Filed: May 13, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent,)
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v.)
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
CODY D.V. SHIRTS,) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant.)
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Elmore County. Hon. Theodore Fleming, District Judge.

Orders revoking probation and ordering execution of underlying sentences, <u>affirmed</u>.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kierra W. Mai, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; HUSKEY, Judge; and TRIBE, Judge

PER CURIAM

In these consolidated appeals, Cody D.V. Shirts appeals from the district court's order revoking his probation. In Docket No. 51929, Shirts pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1). In exchange for his guilty plea, an additional charge was dismissed. The district court imposed a unified term of five years with two years determinate and retained jurisdiction. In Docket No. 51930, Shirts pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and grand theft, I.C. §§ 18-3316, 18-2403(4), 18-2407(1)(b)(6). In exchange for his guilty plea, an additional charge was dismissed. The district court imposed a unified term of five years with two years determinates and grand theft, I.C. §§ 18-3316, 18-2403(4), 18-2407(1)(b)(6). In exchange for his guilty plea, an additional charge was dismissed. The district court imposed a unified term of five years with

two years determinate for unlawful possession of a firearm, a unified term of ten years with three years determinate for grand theft, and retained jurisdiction.

Following the periods of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Shirts on probation for a period of five years in each case. Subsequently, Shirts admitted to violating the terms of the probation, and the district court consequently revoked probation, executed the underlying sentence, and credited Shirts for days served in each case. Shirts appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and executing the underlying sentences.

It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. I.C. § 19-2601(4). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. Id.

Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. *See State v. Hernandez*, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); *State v. Lopez*, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); *State v. Toohill*, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. *State v. Oliver*, 144 Idaho 722,

726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the district court. *State v. Biggs*, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150, 154 (Ct. App. 2020).

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. *State v. Hanington*, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. *Id.* Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record on appeal. *Morgan*, 153 Idaho at 621, 288 P.3d at 838.

Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering execution of Shirts' sentences. Therefore, the orders revoking probation and directing execution of Shirts' previously suspended sentences are affirmed.