

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 50808 & 50809

STATE OF IDAHO,)
)
 Plaintiff-Respondent,) **Filed: February 20, 2024**
)
 v.) **Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk**
)
 JOHN MICHAEL LAMAR SOUZA,) **THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED**
) **OPINION AND SHALL NOT**
) **BE CITED AS AUTHORITY**
 Defendant-Appellant.)
)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge.

Orders revoking probation, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; HUSKEY, Judge;
and LORELLO, Judge

PER CURIAM

In Docket No. 50808, John Michael Lamar Souza pled guilty to robbery. I.C. § 18-6501. In exchange for his guilty plea, additional charges were dismissed. The district court sentenced Souza to unified term of twenty years, with a minimum period of confinement of five years, but after a period of retained jurisdiction, suspended the sentence and placed Souza on probation.

Thereafter, in Docket No. 50809, Souza pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. I.C. § 18-3316. The district court sentenced Souza to a unified term of five years, with a minimum period of confinement of three years. Based on this conviction, Souza also admitted to violating

the terms of his probation in Docket No. 50808. The district court revoked Souza's probation and ordered execution of his original sentence. The district court also ordered that Souza's sentences be served consecutively but retained jurisdiction in both cases and again sent Souza to participate in the rider program. Following completion of his rider, the district court again placed Souza on probation.

Subsequently, Souza admitted to violating the terms of the probation, and the district court consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original sentences. Souza appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and that the sentences are excessive.

It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; *State v. Beckett*, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); *State v. Adams*, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); *State v. Hass*, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. *State v. Upton*, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; *Hass*, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; *State v. Marks*, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. *State v. Urrabazo*, 150 Idaho 158, 162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2010). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation. *State v. Morgan*, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. *Id.*

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. See *State v. Hernandez*, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-

15 (Ct. App. 1991); *State v. Lopez*, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); *State v. Toohill*, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. *State v. Oliver*, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the district court. *State v. Biggs*, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150, 154 (Ct. App. 2020).

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. *State v. Hanington*, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. *Id.* Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record on appeal. *State v. Morgan*, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012).

Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in either revoking probation or in ordering execution of Souza's sentences without modification. Therefore, the orders revoking probation and directing execution of Souza's previously suspended sentences are affirmed.