

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 50497/50498

STATE OF IDAHO,)
)
 Plaintiff-Respondent,) **Filed: December 28, 2023**
)
 v.) **Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk**
)
 DAVID DEAN STAPLETON,) **THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED**
) **OPINION AND SHALL NOT**
) **BE CITED AS AUTHORITY**
 Defendant-Appellant.)
)
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Michael Reardon, District Judge.

Order revoking probation and executing previously suspended sentence, and judgment of conviction and unified sentence of ten years, with a minimum period of incarceration of three years, for felony driving under the influence of alcohol; affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender; Emily M. Joyce, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

Before LORELLO, Chief Judge; GRATTON, Judge;
and HUSKEY, Judge

PER CURIAM

This appeal involves two consolidated cases. In Docket No. 50497, David Dean Stapleton pleaded guilty to aggravated driving under the influence, Idaho Code § 18-8006. The district court sentenced Stapleton to a unified sentence of ten years, with a minimum period of incarceration of two years, suspended the sentence, and placed Stapleton on a term of probation. Subsequently, Stapleton admitted to violating the terms of his probation, which included admitting to a new charge in Docket No. 50498, and the district court revoked Stapleton’s probation and ordered execution of the previously suspended sentence. In Docket No. 50498, Stapleton pleaded guilty

to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (one felony conviction within fifteen years), I.C. §§ 18-8004, -8005, and the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with a minimum period of incarceration of three years, to run concurrently with the sentence in Docket No. 50497. Stapleton appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation in Docket No. 50497 and by imposing an excessive sentence in Docket No. 50498.

It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; *State v. Beckett*, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); *State v. Adams*, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); *State v. Hass*, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. *State v. Upton*, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; *Hass*, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; *State v. Marks*, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. I.C. § 19-2601(4). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation. *State v. Morgan*, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. *Id.*

Next, sentencing is also a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. *See State v. Hernandez*, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); *State v. Lopez*, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); *State v. Toohill*, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. *State v. Oliver*, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds

could reach the same conclusion as the district court. *State v. Biggs*, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150, 154 (Ct. App. 2020).

Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the records in these cases, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation and ordering execution of Stapleton's previously suspended sentence in Docket No. 50497 or by imposing sentence in Docket No. 50498. Therefore, the order revoking probation, directing execution of Stapleton's previously suspended sentence in Docket No. 50497, and the judgment of conviction and sentence in Docket No. 50498 are affirmed.