## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

## Docket No. 49900

STATE OF IDAHO,	)
	) Filed: May 11, 2023
Plaintiff-Respondent,	)
	) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
<b>v.</b>	)
	) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
DANIEL RAY FISHER,	) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
	) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant.	)
	)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Jason D. Scott, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of eight years with three years determinate for one count of delivery of a controlled substance, <u>affirmed</u>.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jacob L. Westerfield, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

Before GRATTON, Judge; HUSKEY, Judge; and BRAILSFORD, Judge

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## PER CURIAM

Daniel Ray Fisher pled guilty to one count of delivery of a controlled substance, Idaho Code § 37-2732(a). The district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years with three years determinate, suspended the sentence, and placed Fisher on probation for five years. Subsequently, Fisher admitted to violating the terms of the probation. The district court consequently revoked and reinstated probation, extending it for an additional year. Two years later, Fisher again admitted to violating his probation. The district court retained jurisdiction and, upon Fisher's completion of retained jurisdiction, placed him on probation for an additional three years. Three years later, Fisher admitted to violating his probation by incurring additional charges. The district court

revoked probation and executed the underlying sentence. Fisher filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence, which the district court denied. Fisher appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and that the sentence is excessive.

It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. I.C. § 19-2601(4). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record on appeal. *Id*.

Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. *See State v. Hernandez*, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); *State v. Lopez*, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); *State v. Toohill*, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. *State v. Oliver*, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the district court. *State v. Biggs*, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150, 154 (Ct. App. 2020).

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.

State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. *Id.* Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record on appeal and are relevant to the defendant's contention that the trial court should have reduced the sentence sua sponte upon revocation of probation. *Morgan*, 153 Idaho at 621, 288 P.3d at 838.

Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering execution of Fisher's sentence without modification. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing execution of Fisher's previously suspended sentence is affirmed.