IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 47046/47047

STATE OF IDAHO,)
Plaintiff-Respondent,) Filed: May 11, 2020
) Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk
v.)
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
WAYNE DOUGLAS WISNIEWSKI,) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant.)
)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. Richard S. Christensen, District Judge.

Order revoking probation and imposing sentence, judgment of conviction and sentence, and orders denying Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, <u>affirmed</u>.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

Before HUSKEY, Chief Judge; GRATTON, Judge; and LORELLO, Judge

PER CURIAM

In Docket No. 47046, Wayne Douglas Wisniewski entered a guilty plea to felony driving under the influence (DUI), and the district court imposed a unified six-year sentence, with two years determinate, suspended the sentence and placed Wisniewski on a term of probation. While on probation, Wisniewski was charged with another felony DUI in Docket No. 47047. Wisniewski entered a guilty plea to the felony DUI in Docket No. 47047 and admitted to violating the terms of his probation in Docket No. 47046. In Docket No. 47047, the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years determinate. In Docket No. 47046, the district court revoked Wisniewski's probation and executed the underlying sentence. The

sentences were ordered to run consecutively. Wisniewski filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion in each case. The district court granted, in part, the Rule 35 motions by ordering the sentences to run concurrently rather than consecutively; the district court did not otherwise reduce the sentences. Wisniewski appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and imposing the underlying sentence in Docket No. 47046, imposing an excessive sentence in Docket No. 47047, and denying, in part, his Rule 35 motions in Docket Nos. 47046 and 47047.

It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. I.C. § 19-2601. A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. *Id.*

Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. *See State v. Hernandez*, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); *State v. Lopez*, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); *State v. Toohill*, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).

When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. *State v. Oliver*, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. *State v. Hanington*, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. *Id.* Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record on appeal and are relevant to the defendant's contention that the trial court should have reduced the sentence sua sponte upon revocation of probation. *Morgan*, 153 Idaho at 621, 288 P.3d at 838.

Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the records in these cases, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in revoking Wisniewski's probation and executing Wisniewski's sentence without modification, by imposing an excessive sentence, or in denying, in part, Wisniewski's Rule 35 motions. Therefore, the order revoking probation and executing Wisniewski's previously suspended sentence in Docket No. 46046; the unified sentence of ten years, with three years determinate, imposed in Docket No. 47047; and the district court's orders denying, in part, Wisniewski's Rule 35 motions, are affirmed.