

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 45963

STATE OF IDAHO, )  
 )  
 ) **Filed: November 4, 2019**  
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 ) **Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk**  
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 ) **THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED**  
 ) **OPINION AND SHALL NOT**  
 ) **BE CITED AS AUTHORITY**  
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Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell and Lansing L. Haynes, District Judges.

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of fifteen years, with a minimum period of confinement of four years, for voluntary manslaughter, affirmed; order denying I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Maya P. Waldron, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

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Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; LORELLO, Judge;  
and BRAILSFORD, Judge

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PER CURIAM

Tyler Matthew Finlay pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. I.C. § 18-4006(1). The district court sentenced Finlay to a unified term of fifteen years, with a minimum period of confinement of four years. Finlay filed an I.C.R. 35 motion, which the district court denied. Finlay appeals, arguing that his sentence is excessive, that the district court should have retained jurisdiction, and that the district court erred in denying his Rule 35 motion.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established. See *State v. Hernandez*, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); *State v. Lopez*, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); *State v. Toohill*, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. *State v. Oliver*, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

We note that the decision to retain jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court. *State v. Hood*, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); *State v. Lee*, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). The primary purpose of a district court retaining jurisdiction is to enable the court to obtain additional information regarding whether the defendant has sufficient rehabilitative potential and is suitable for probation. *State v. Jones*, 141 Idaho 673, 677, 115 P.3d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2005). Probation is the ultimate goal of retained jurisdiction. *Id.* There can be no abuse of discretion if the district court has sufficient evidence before it to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation. *Id.* The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to retain jurisdiction.

Next, we review whether the district court erred in denying Finlay's Rule 35 motion. A motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. *State v. Knighton*, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006); *State v. Allbee*, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion. *State v. Huffman*, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Upon review of the record, including any new information submitted with Finlay's Rule 35 motion, we conclude no abuse of discretion has been shown.

Therefore, Finlay's judgment of conviction and sentence, and the district court's order denying Finlay's Rule 35 motion, are affirmed.