

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 45656

STATE OF IDAHO,)
)
) **Filed: October 22, 2018**
)
) **Plaintiff-Respondent,**)
) **Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk**
)
) **v.**)
) **THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED**
) **ERIK DAVID REYNOLDS,**) **OPINION AND SHALL NOT**
) **BE CITED AS AUTHORITY**
) **Defendant-Appellant.**)
)
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of seven years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years, for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly A. Coster, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;
and HUSKEY, Judge

PER CURIAM

Erik David Reynolds pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance. Idaho Code § 37-2732(c). The district court sentenced Reynolds to a unified term of seven years with two years determinate. Reynolds appeals asserting that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and by not giving Reynolds the opportunity to participate in the retained jurisdiction program.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and

need not be repeated here. See *State v. Hernandez*, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); *State v. Lopez*, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); *State v. Toohill*, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. *State v. Oliver*, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

The primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial court to obtain additional information regarding the defendant's rehabilitative potential and suitability for probation, and probation is the ultimate objective of a defendant who is on retained jurisdiction. *State v. Chapel*, 107 Idaho 193, 687 P.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1984); *State v. Toohill*, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct. App. 1982). There can be no abuse of discretion in a trial court's refusal to retain jurisdiction if the court already has sufficient information upon which to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation. *State v. Beebe*, 113 Idaho 977, 979, 751 P.2d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 1988); *Toohill*, 103 Idaho at 567, 650 P.2d at 709. Based upon the information that was before the district court at the time of sentencing, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to retain jurisdiction.

Therefore, Reynolds' judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.