

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 41009/41010

STATE OF IDAHO,)	2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 610
)	
Plaintiff-Respondent,)	Filed: July 7, 2014
)	
v.)	Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)	
CHARLES ANTHONY JONES,)	THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
)	OPINION AND SHALL NOT
Defendant-Appellant.)	BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)	

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Timothy L. Hansen, District Judge.

Orders revoking probation and requiring execution of unified seven-year sentence with three-year determinate term for possession of methamphetamine, and concurrent unified ten-year sentence with three-year determinate term for burglary, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Shawn F. Wilkerson, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge;
and GRATTON, Judge

PER CURIAM

In Docket No. 41009, Charles Anthony Jones pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c). The district court imposed a unified seven-year sentence with a three-year determinate term, suspended the sentence, and placed Jones on probation. As a term of probation, Jones was ordered to complete the Ada County Veteran's Court program. In Docket No. 41010, Jones pled guilty to burglary, I.C. § 18-1401. The district court imposed a concurrent unified ten-year sentence with a five-year determinate term and ordered completion of the Ada County Veteran's Court program. Subsequently, Jones admitted

to violating his probation in both cases by failing to complete the Veteran's Court program. The district court consequently revoked probation in both cases and ordered execution of Jones's sentences, reducing the burglary sentence to a unified term of ten years with three years determinate. Jones filed Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motions in both cases, which were denied. Jones appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation, in failing to sua sponte reduce his sentence in the possession case, and in failing to further reduce his burglary sentence.

It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; *State v. Beckett*, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); *State v. Adams*, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); *State v. Hass*, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. *State v. Upton*, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; *Hass*, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; *State v. Marks*, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. *State v. Urrabazo*, 150 Idaho 158, 162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2010). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation. *State v. Morgan*, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. *Id.*

Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. *See State v. Hernandez*, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); *State v. Lopez*, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); *State v. Toohill*, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).

When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. *State v. Oliver*, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. *State v. Hanington*, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of the probation. *Id.* Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record on appeal and are relevant to the defendant's contention that the trial court should have reduced the sentence sua sponte upon revocation of probation. *Morgan*, 153 Idaho at 621, 288 P.3d at 838.

Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation. Assuming that Jones can challenge the district court's failure to sua sponte reduce his sentences, we also conclude that the district court did not err in ordering execution of Jones's sentences without further modification. Therefore, the orders revoking probation and directing execution of Jones's previously suspended sentences are affirmed.