## Chapter 12: Special Topics

### 12.1 RELEVANT FEDERAL STATUTES

**Timeline of Major Federal Legislation Concerned with Child Protection, Child Welfare, and Adoption**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010’s</strong></td>
<td><strong>Family First Prevention Services Act Subtitle A-investing in Prevention and Support Families (of 2017)</strong> (P.L. 15-123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act (of 2014)</strong> (P.L. 113-183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Intercountry Adoption Universal Accreditation Act of 2012</strong> (P.L. 112-276)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Protect our kids Act of 2012</strong> (P.L. 112-275)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Child Protection Act of 2012</strong> (P.L. 112-206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Child and Family Services Improvement and Innovation Act of 2011</strong> (P.L. 112-34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010</strong> (P.L. 111-320)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010</strong> (P.L. 111-148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2000’s</strong></td>
<td><strong>Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008</strong> (P.L. 110-351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006</strong> (P.L. 109-432)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Child and Family Services Improvement Act of 2006</strong> (P.L. 109-288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006</strong> (P.L. 109-248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Safe and Timely Interstate Placement of Foster Children Act of 2006</strong> (P.L. 109-239)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Deficit Reduction Act of 2005</strong> (P.L. 109-171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Fair Access Foster Care Act of 2005</strong> (P.L. 109-113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Adoption Promotion Act of 2003</strong> (P.L. 108-145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Promoting Safe and Stable Families Act of 2001</strong> (P.L. 107-133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000</strong> (P.L. 106-279)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Child Abuse Prevention and Enforcement Act of 2000</strong> (P.L. 106-177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1990’s</strong></td>
<td><strong>Foster Care Independence Act of 1999</strong> (P.L. 106-169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997</strong> (P.L. 105-89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Amendments (CAPTA) of 1996</strong> (P.L. 104-235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>The Interethnic Provisions of 1996 amends MEPA</strong> (P.L. 104-188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Multietnic Placement Act (MEPA) of 1994</strong> (P.L. 103-382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Family Preservation and Support Services Program Act of 1993</strong> (P.L. 103-66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Child Abuse, Domestic Violence, Adoption, and Family Services Act of 1992</strong> (P.L. 102-295)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1980’s</strong></td>
<td><strong>Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption, and Family Services Act of 1988</strong> (P.L. 100-294)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Child Abuse Amendments of 1984</strong> (P.L. 98-457)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980</strong> (P.L. 96-272)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1970’s</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) of 1978</strong> (P.L. 95-608)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978</strong> (P.L. 95-266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) of 1974</strong> (P.L. 93-247)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

12.2 IDAHO JUVENILE RULE 16 EXPANSIONS

Idaho Juvenile Rule 16\(^2\) is a powerful tool, used by judges in Juvenile Corrections Act (JCA) cases to ensure collaboration between the juvenile justice system and the child protection system. Each system offers different services and resources and the workers in each system have different strengths and skill sets. Both systems may be needed to meet the needs of a child and her or his family.

Without notice, a chance to plan, or an opportunity to follow normal investigative procedures, Rule 16 expansions may place the Department in a difficult and time sensitive situation. Sometimes there are no other options; when possible, however, actions can be taken to more effectively use a Rule 16 expansion.

In some cases, the facts present decision makers with a choice regarding whether a child is required to appear before a judge in a juvenile corrections case or whether her/his parents appear in a child protection case. For example, if a child is caught stealing food at a local market, he or she can be charged with violation of the JCA. The officer might charge and release, or charge and notify parents, or charge and take the child to detention. If the officer chooses any of these options, the child becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system. In the alternative, the officer might decide to take the child home where the officer might discover that the child’s parents cannot be located. Further investigation might reveal that the child and/or the child’s siblings were left by the parents with inadequate food and that hunger lead to the stealing incident. Rather than pursuing one of the options provided by the JCA, the officer might decide to make a declaration of imminent danger. If this happens, the child, and most likely her or his siblings, will become part of the child protection system.

Much research has focused on the link between juvenile justice and child welfare.\(^3\) Research demonstrates that abused and neglected youth are at heightened risk for early onset of delinquency.\(^4\)

While judges in Idaho do not determine how the child enters the court system, Idaho judges have the authority to take actions to meet the needs of the child by expanding JCA cases to CPA cases. Idaho Code § 20-520(m) provides that JCA judges can “\[o\]rder the proceedings expanded or altered to include consideration of the cause pursuant to Chapter 16,

\[\]

Note re Terminology: In this manual, “prosecutor” refers to both a county prosecutor and/or a deputy attorney general; “Indian child” refers to all native children as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA); and “IDHW” and “the Department” are used interchangeably to refer to the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare.

\(^2\) The statutory basis for Rule 16 is found in I.C. § 20-520(m) (2017).

\(^3\) NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES 21 (2005).

Chapter 12: Special Topics

Idaho Child Protection Manual

CURRENT UPDATES CAN BE FOUND ONLINE AT: ISC.IDAHO.GOV/CHILD-PROTECTION/RESOURCE

LAST REVISED: MAY, 2018

Title 16, Idaho Code.5 Idaho Juvenile Rule 16 prescribes the procedure for expanding a JCA case to a CPA case and also allows the court to order the Department of Health and Welfare to investigate and report to the court without expanding to a CPA.

The Child Protective Act also contemplates a CPA case expanding to a JCA proceeding. Section 16-1613(3) provides: "At any stage of a proceeding under this chapter, if the court determines that it is in the best interests of the child or society, the court may cause the proceeding to be expanded or altered to include full or partial consideration of the cause under the juvenile corrections act without terminating the original proceeding under this chapter."6 However, there is no rule that prescribes how this expansion is to occur and the process has been rarely used.

Tools in both systems allow a judge to access collateral information and services to meet the needs of the youth. These include:

1. Idaho Code § 20-511A allows the court, in a JCA or a CPA case, to order assessment and screening teams for juveniles with mental health issues.7

2. Idaho Code § 20-520, the sentencing provisions for the JCA, give judges broad authority to order the evaluation, assessment, and treatment of substance abuse or mental health issues.8

3. Idaho Code § 20-523 allows the court in a JCA case to order a screening team composed of officers or agencies designated by the court to screen and make recommendations to the court.9

Each of these tools has its own purpose. The key is using each tool at the proper time to address the child’s issues and to provide resources from different sources. The division of responsibilities within and between agencies can sometimes create barriers to the delivery of services to the child. The court can facilitate collaboration among agencies to ensure appropriate and timely services for the child.

Best practice recommendations in the use of Rule 16 include:

1. Inviting an IDHW representative to JCA hearings when the use of Rule 16 is contemplated.

2. When possible, ordering an investigation prior to an expansion.

3. Using screening teams, as authorized by Idaho Code Section 20-511A and Idaho Juvenile Rule 19, where possible.

4. If expansion or investigation is ordered, providing a copy of court records to IDHW from the JCA proceedings.

*     *     *

7 I.C. § 20-511A (2017). Childhood maltreatment and neglect can cause a host of short and long-term negative consequences. Early physical abuse and neglect may impede development and cause adverse alterations to important regions of the brain, which can have long-term cognitive, emotional, and behavioral consequences. Children abused early in life may exhibit poor physical and mental health well into adulthood. ROBIN KARR-MORSE, ET AL., GHOSTS FROM THE NURSERY: TRACING THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE (1999).
8 I.C. § 20-520.
9 I.J.R. 19 allows the court to convene screening teams with state agencies (e.g.: the Department of Health and Welfare and the Department of Juvenile Corrections), and local entities (e.g.: county Juvenile Probation and school districts), and the family of the child, required by the court to cooperate in planning for the child.
12.3 NOTIFYING AND INCLUDING UNWED FATHERS IN CHILD PROTECTIVE ACT PROCEEDINGS

The Idaho Child Protective Act (CPA) does not define the term “parent.” As a result, significant issues can arise in determining whether and when an absent father should be joined as a party in a CPA proceeding. Courts and lawyers confronted with questions regarding the status of an alleged father in a CPA case should carefully evaluate related statutory definitions of parents contained in the Idaho adoption and termination of parental rights statutes and in the Idaho law regarding the establishment of paternity. In addition, state and federal case law regarding the constitutional rights of unwed fathers also should be considered.

A. Idaho Statutory Provisions Regarding the Definition of “Parent”

1. Paternity Statute

The paternity statute establishes two processes for legally establishing paternity. Paternity proceedings may be initiated by the filing of a verified Voluntary Acknowledgement of Parentage10 or by filing a verified complaint naming a defendant who is the alleged father of the child.11

The paternity statute does not define the term “parent.” However, the term “father” is defined as “the biological father of a child born out of wedlock.”12 In Johnson v. Studley-Preston,13 the Idaho Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “born out of wedlock” in this definition to refer to the status of the biological parents’ relationship to each other. Thus, the Court concluded that a child born to a married woman, but biologically conceived with a man other than her husband, was “born out of wedlock” even though the biological mother of the child was married, because the biological parents of the child were not married to each other.14 Based on this reasoning, the Court concluded that the father of a child born while the mother was married to another person had standing to bring an action under the paternity statute.

2. Adoption Statute

The adoption statute does not define the term “parent.” By implication, as the following analysis indicates, however, the statute provides guidance on who might be

---

10 I.C. § 7-1111(1) (2010); see also I.C. § 7-1106 (governing voluntary acknowledgments of paternity which are discussed later in this section).
11 Id.
12 I.C. § 7-1103(4).
13 119 Idaho 1055, 812 P. 2d 1216 (1991). But see Doe v. Roe (In re Doe), 142 Idaho 202, 127 P. 3d 105 (2005) (Doe I 2005). In Doe I 2005, the married, presumed father brought an action to terminate the parental rights of the unmarried, biological father of the child. The Court held that an unmarried biological father was not a “father” and that he had no rights that required termination because he had not pursued a paternity action, filed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity, or taken steps to establish a relationship with his child. In an appropriate situation, the court could enter an order of non-establishment of paternity, to clarify the status of the biological father.
14 Johnson, 119 Idaho at 1057, 812 P. 2d at 1218.
considered a parent through its provisions regarding who must consent to and/or receive notice of an adoption.

a. Consent

The consent of the man who fits in one of the following four groups is required for an adoption:

i. The consent of both parents (including the father) is required for the adoption of a child who was “conceived or born within a marriage.”

This provision implies that a man who is married to the mother at the time a child is conceived or born has at least an interest in being considered the father of the child. In addition, the notice provisions of the adoption statute provide that “any person who is married to the child’s mother at the time she executes her consent to the adoption or relinquishes the child for adoption” is entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding. These provisions are consistent with the termination of parent-child relationship statute (“TPR statute”) which defines a “presumed father” as a “man who is or was married to the birth mother and the child is born during the marriage or within three hundred (300) days after the marriage is terminated.”

This provision of the adoption statute is also consistent with the paternity statute, which provides a means by which the man married to the mother at the time of the conception or birth of a child, can file an “affidavit of non-paternity.” The negative implication is that, without such a process, the man married to the mother at the time of the conception or birth of a child might otherwise be considered the father of the child.

These statutory provisions were not addressed by the Court in Johnson v. Studley-Preston, where the court concluded that the unmarried biological father of a child could be considered the father under the paternity statute even where the mother was married to someone else at the time of the child’s birth. As a result of the court’s reasoning in Johnson and the language of the adoption statute, it may be necessary to treat both the unmarried biological father and the husband of the biological mother, as fathers for purposes of adoption.

---

Chapter 12: Special Topics

Idaho Child Protection Manual

ii. A man who has been adjudicated the biological father by a court, prior to the mother’s execution of consent to the adoption, must consent to an adoption.\(^{20}\) Pursuant to this provision, the consent of any man who obtains a timely adjudication of paternity is required for a subsequent adoption of the child.\(^{21}\)

iii. An unmarried biological father who has filed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity pursuant to the paternity statute.\(^{22}\) The paternity statute provides that an appropriately executed, notarized voluntary acknowledgement of paternity filed with the Department “shall constitute a legal finding of paternity.”\(^{23}\) While the language of the adoption statute could be read to imply that the father can file such an acknowledgment on his own, the paternity statute makes clear that a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity must be executed by both the “alleged father” and the mother of the child.\(^{24}\) The Idaho Paternity statute appears to extend parenthood only to a biological father who signs a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity. Yet the Supreme Court has recently held that a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity signed by a man who was not the biological parent of the child, could only be set aside based on fraud, duress or material mistake of fact.\(^{25}\)

iv. An unmarried biological father who demonstrates through his conduct that he is committed to fulfilling his responsibilities as a father toward the child must consent to an adoption if he meets certain requirements and conditions.\(^{26}\) Pursuant to the adoption statute, the unmarried biological father must fall within one of these three categories:\(^{27}\)
   a. If the child is more than six months of age at the time of placement, the unmarried biological father must have “developed a substantial relationship with the child, taken some measure of responsibility for the child and the child’s future, and demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by financial support of the child,” and, when not prevented from doing so by a third party, either visited the child monthly or communicated with the child regularly;

\(^{21}\) Interestingly, the Paternity Statute assumes that a man would either voluntarily acknowledge paternity or would resist the allegation that he is the father of a child, as it provides the verified complaint in a paternity proceeding must allege that “the person named as defendant is the father of the child.” I.C. § 7-1111(1) (2010)(emphasis added).
\(^{23}\) I.C. § 7-1106(1) (2010).
\(^{24}\) Id.
\(^{26}\) I.C. § 16-1504(1)(e) (Supp. 2014).
\(^{27}\) These provisions are all set forth in I.C. § 16-1504(2).
b. The unmarried biological father must have lived openly with the child for a period of six months within one year after the birth of the child and immediately preceding the placement of the child with adoptive parents, and must have “openly held himself out to be the father of the child”; or,

c. If the child is under six months of age at the time of placement, the unmarried biological father must have commenced paternity proceedings and must file an affidavit stating that he is fully able and willing to have full custody of the child, setting forth his plans for the care of the child, and agreeing to a court order of child support and payment of expenses incurred in connection with the mother’s pregnancy and the child’s birth. In addition, the unmarried biological father must file a notice of his commencement of paternity proceedings with the Bureau of Vital Statistics pursuant to Idaho Code § 16-1513. Finally, if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy he must pay a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in connection with the mother’s pregnancy and the child’s birth in accordance with his means and assuming he was not prevented from doing so by a third party. Idaho Code § 16-1513 provides that the required notice and filing of paternity proceedings must be filed prior to the placement of the child for adoption.28

d. If an unmarried biological father resides in another state, he may contest an adoption if he and the mother both resided in the other state, the mother left without notifying or informing the father that she could be found in Idaho, the father attempted through every reasonable means to locate the mother, and the father complied with the unwed father requirements of the state in which he resides.29 To avoid a later attack on an adoption, best efforts must be undertaken to identify and notify unwed fathers in other states even though they have not complied with Idaho’s adoption provisions.

In Doe I 200530 the Idaho Supreme Court interpreted these provisions in the context of a termination of parental rights case. The TPR statute cross-references and incorporates the notice and consent provisions of the adoption statute.31 In Doe I 2005, the Idaho Supreme Court held that an unmarried biological father was not a “father” whose rights had to be terminated under the TPR statute. It reasoned that the father in the case was not entitled to notice of the termination of parental rights action because he did not fall within any of the categories of men under the TPR statute or under the incorporated adoption notice and consent

28 I.C. § 16-1513(2). But see Burch v. Hearn, 116 Idaho 956, 782 P. 2d 1238 (1989)(A paternity action may be filed at any time within the paternity statute’s time limitations if it is not connected to an adoption or action to terminate parental rights).
29 I.C. § 16-1504(8).
31 See I.C. § 16-2007, cross-referencing and incorporating the adoption notice provisions in I.C. § 16-1505. I.C. § 16-1505, the adoption notice provision, cross-references and incorporates the adoption consent provision, I.C. § 16-1504.
provisions, who were entitled to notice. The unmarried biological father had not filed in the Putative Father Registry nor had he attempted to file a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. He had not commenced paternity proceedings. Finally, he had never attempted to support his child or establish a relationship with his child over a four-year period. Since the child’s birth, the father had had no contact with the child and had not paid support; he had expressed interest in the child at the urging of the mother in order to assist her in her custody dispute with her husband (the “presumed father” of the child).

The Idaho Supreme Court recently affirmed the reasoning of Doe I 2005 in Department of Health & Welfare v. Doe (hereinafter Doe II 2010). It held that an unmarried biological father was not a person whose rights had to be terminated under the TPR statute. In Doe II 2010, the Court concluded that there was no reason to terminate the rights of an unmarried biological father who had not been adjudicated the father of the child, had not filed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity, and had not established a relationship with the child or supported the child. In the four years after the child’s birth, the biological father had been in prison, had only two contacts with the child, and had contributed only a very small amount indirectly to the child’s support.

b. Notice

In addition to the consent provisions outlined above, the adoption statute provides that certain additional men, whose consent is not required by the statute, must nonetheless receive notice of an adoption proceeding. The adoption statute expressly provides that the purpose of notice is to enable the notified person to “present evidence to the court relevant to the best interest of the child.” Three categories of people are entitled to such notice:

- Any person recorded on the birth certificate as the child’s father with the knowledge and consent of the mother unless such right to notice or parental rights have been previously terminated.
- Any person who is openly living in the same household with the child at the time the mother’s consent is executed or relinquishment made, and who is holding himself out to be the child’s father, unless such rights to notice or parental rights have been previously terminated.
- Any person who is married to the child’s mother at the time she executes her consent to the adoption or relinquishes the child for adoption.

These notice provisions are especially ambiguous. The first two provisions expressly condition the right to notice on the fact that the parental rights of the

32 Doe I 2005, 142 Idaho at 205, 127 P. 3d at 108.
33 The Idaho TPR statute provides that the man married to the mother at the time the child is conceived or born is the “presumptive father.” I.C. § 16-2002(12).
34 Dep’t. of Health & Welfare. v. Doe (In the interest of Doe), 150 Idaho 88, 244 P. 3d 232 (2010)(Doe II 2010).
36 I.C. § 16-1505(1)(d).
37 I.C. § 16-1505(1)(e).
38 I.C. § 16-1505(1)(f).
covered persons have not been terminated. Yet some individuals who come within these notice provisions would not be required to consent to an adoption of the child, and under Doe I 2005 and Doe 2010 do not have parental rights that must be terminated. Yet, the consent of a man under the third provision is expressly required by the adoption statute.

The Idaho Supreme Court has not interpreted these provisions of the adoption statute. Thus, it is not clear whether this right to notice for the purpose of presenting evidence regarding the child’s best interest means that men covered under these provisions but not fitting in any of the provisions regarding consent to adoption could be considered to be a father of the child.

B. Termination of Parental-Child Relationship Statute

The TPR Statute defines “parent” as:
   (a) The birth mother or the adoptive mother,
   (b) The adoptive father,
   (c) The biological father of a child conceived or born during the father’s marriage to the mother, and
   (d) The unmarried biological father whose consent to an adoption of the child is required pursuant to § 16-1504, Idaho Code.39

With regard to part (d), any person in one of the four adoption consent categories discussed above would be considered a “parent” for purposes of termination of parental rights.

The TPR statute further provides that a “presumptive father” is “a man who is or was married to the birth mother and the child is born during the marriage or within three hundred (300) days after the marriage is terminated.”40 Finally, the TPR statute provides that “unmarried biological father “…means the biological father of a child who was not married to the child’s mother at the time the child was conceived or born.”41

While the definitions of a parent whose rights may be terminated under the TPR statute appear at first blush to be consistent with the provisions for consent to adoption (although not the provisions for notice of adoption), the notice provision in the TPR statute creates new ambiguity. It states that where a “putative father” has failed to commence paternity proceedings in a timely fashion notice is not required “unless such putative father is one of those persons specifically set forth in section

39 I.C. § 16-2002(11) (Supp. 2014). In Roe Fam. Servs. v. Doe (In re Bay Boy Doe), 139 Idaho 930, 88 P. 3d 749 (2004)(Doe 2004), the Court reasoned that a father who, with the mother, had completed a “Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity Application” and who was subsequently listed as the father on the child’s birth certificate was an “unmarried biological father” under I.C. § 16-2002(p) (Supp. 2014). This section has been amended and is now I.C. § 16-2002(11).
40 I.C. § 16-2002(12).
41 I.C. § 16-2002(15).
16-1505(1), Idaho Code." The referenced provision is the adoption notice provision. Thus, it appears that by its express language the TPR statute requires notice to be provided to any person whose consent would be required for adoption because such persons are “parents” for purposes of the TPR statute, as well as any person who is entitled to notice of an adoption action. Like the adoption statute’s notice provisions, the TPR notice provisions do not clarify whether the parental rights of a man entitled to notice but not fitting the definition of “parent” must be terminated.

C. U.S. Supreme Court Authority Relevant to the Constitutional Rights of Unmarried Fathers

In a series of cases beginning with Stanley v. Illinois, and through Lehr v. Robertson the United States Supreme Court has made clear that an unwed father has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in establishing a relationship with his child. The Court has concluded that this interest is strongest when the father has lived together with the child in a family unit and that the right cannot be unilaterally terminated without notice by a state’s failure to provide an adequate procedural framework that allows the unwed father to protect his rights.

In Stanley, the unwed father and mother had lived together for approximately 18 years, during which they had three children. When the mother died suddenly, the state of Illinois initiated a dependency proceeding, took custody of the children as wards of the state, and declined to give Stanley, the father, an opportunity to be heard. The state court reasoned that Stanley did not have a right to be heard because he was not married to his children’s mother. The state statutory scheme assumed that “an unwed father is not a ‘parent’ whose existing relationship with his children must be considered.”

The Supreme Court rejected the implicit state presumption that all unwed fathers were unfit. Rather, the Court held that a state cannot terminate the parental rights of an unwed father who has lived together with his children in a family unit without first conducting a hearing to determine whether the father is unfit. It rejected the state’s argument regarding efficient handling of adoption, concluding instead that:

> procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child.

The Stanley reasoning was extended by the U. S. Supreme Court in Quillon v. Wolcott and Caban v. Mohammed. In both of these cases, stepfathers sought to

---

42 I.C. § 16-2007(5).
44 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649-50.
45 Id.
adopt stepchildren over the objections of the children’s biological fathers. As in many states at the time, statutes in both jurisdictions provided that an unmarried father's child could be adopted without his consent if the court found the adoption to be in the child’s best interests. However, the statutes also allowed other categories of parents, “married fathers and all mothers,” to veto adoption of their children unless the vetoing parent was found to be unfit or to have abandoned the child. In both Quilloin and Caban, the unmarried fathers challenged the constitutionality of these statutory schemes on equal protection and substantive due process grounds arguing that, like other parents, their parental rights could not be terminated without notice and a hearing, at which they would be accorded the opportunity to present evidence regarding the best interests of the child.

In Quilloin, the unwed father had had little or no contact with the child or mother in the nine years after the child’s birth. He had not paid child support, had rarely visited or contacted the child, and had not filed any action to establish his paternity. Only after the stepfather began proceedings to adopt the child did the unwed birth father make any attempt to assert his parental rights. The Court held that because the father had not lived together in a family unit with his child and had not “seized his opportunity interest,” he had no protectable liberty interest in establishing his parentage. Thus, it upheld the statutory scheme.

In Caban, the father had lived together with his children and their mother for two years, and thereafter had substantial, although sometimes indirect, contact with the children. The Court reasoned that he had a cognizable liberty interest in continuing his relationship with his children. He had lived with them and their mother for the first two years of their lives. After that, he had indirect contact with them through their grandmother over a period of several years. He did not seek to establish his paternity formally. Nor did he pay child support to the children’s mother. However, the Court recognized that, despite failing to comply with formal obligations of parenthood, Caban had “established a parental relationship” with his children, and the Court thus concluded that the statutory scheme that treated an unwed father with an established parental relationship differently from mothers and married fathers violated Caban’s equal protection rights.

Together, Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban established the fundamental principle that an unwed father who has lived in a family unit with his children or otherwise has established a relationship with them through contact, establishing paternity, and/or paying child support has a constitutionally protected liberty interest that cannot be ignored because he has not filed a paternity action and was not married to his children’s mother. The most important factor considered by the court in this trio of cases was whether the father actually had resided with the children as part of a family unit. The cases did not address the rights of unwed fathers who had not yet had the opportunity to establish a parental relationship.

---

48 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
49 Caban, 441 U.S. at 385.
This latter situation was addressed in *Lehr v. Robertson*. In *Lehr*, the father had expressed his interest in parenting the child since the child’s birth but never had the opportunity to establish a relationship with the child because of the interference of the mother and because of his own ineffectiveness. The Court recognized that even a father with no established relationship with his child has a liberty interest protected by the Constitution:

> [T]he significance of the biological connection [between father and child] is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a state to listen to his opinion of where the child’s best interests lie.”

The Court concluded that a state could terminate the parental rights of an unwed father who had not established a relationship with his child only if the state provided the opportunity for the father to assert his relationship. Such an opportunity is provided where the state has a statutory scheme that is likely to notify most interested fathers and that provides the father a way of asserting parental rights independent of the mother. In *Lehr*, the Court found that the New York statute in question required notice be provided to seven categories of men who might be interested in being a father, including men who had resided with the mother during the pregnancy and/or after the child’s birth and who held themselves out as the father of the child. In addition, the Court approved New York’s “putative father registry”, which permitted men to register their interest in paternity by filing a post card with the state.

The most recent U.S. Supreme Court case in this area is *Michael H. v. Gerald D.* The Court held that California’s conclusive presumption that the man married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth is the legal father of the child did not violate the due process rights of the unwed biological father. The case involved a situation in which the mother, while separated from her husband, had a child and lived with the child and the child’s biological father in a family unit for a period of time. The relationship between the mother and father broke up and the mother reconciled with her husband. When the biological father attempted to formally establish his paternity and obtain visitation with the child, the mother and her husband argued that California law barred the father’s action. The Supreme Court recognized the constitutional rights of the unwed father, but reasoned that a state could constitutionally prefer the marital father to the unwed father because of the importance of protecting the marital relationship.

51 *Lehr*, 463 U.S. at 262.
Read together, *Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr* stand for the proposition that all fathers have a constitutionally protected interest in parenting their children. While fathers who have established relationships with their children are entitled to more constitutional protection than fathers who have not yet established their relationships with their children, even unwed fathers in this latter group cannot be completely foreclosed from decision making regarding their child under all circumstances. These men, according to *Lehr*, have an “opportunity interest” that no other man has to establish a relationship with their children. Because of this interest, states may not terminate the parental rights of a man who has an established family relationship with his children without providing notice and a right to be heard on the question of the children’s best interests. Furthermore, states must have a statutory scheme that is calculated to include most responsible unwed fathers within the requirement for notice and which provides an unmarried father the ability to assert parental rights that is within the reach of the putative father and not subject to veto through the actions of a third party (such as the child’s mother). Finally, however, the constitutional rights of an unwed father may be secondary to a state’s interest in protecting and fostering marriage.

**D. Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Cases Relevant to the Rights of Unmarried Fathers**

The Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have decided a number of cases in recent years relevant to the interpretation of the Idaho provisions regarding unwed fathers.

The first such case was *Steve B.D. v. Swan*. There, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted some of the reasoning of *Lehr*. In *Steve B.D.*, the father knew of the child’s birth and visited the child and mother in the hospital. After that time, however, he had no contact with the child, offered no financial support for the child, refused to sign an affidavit of paternity, and did not marry the child’s mother. The father also did not file in the Idaho Putative Father Registry, which existed at that time. After the child’s birth, the mother, without the knowledge of the father, placed the child for adoption and stated under oath that she did not know who the father of the child was. Subsequently, the mother attempted to revoke her consent to the adoption. At the time, efforts were being made to provide the father with notice by publication (based on the mother’s testimony that she did not know who the father was), and the unwed father was subsequently permitted to intervene in the mother’s action to revoke her consent to adoption. The father argued that he relied on the mother’s representations that she planned to keep the child. Under those circumstances, the Idaho Court found that although the father had an “opportunity interest” under *Lehr v. Robinson*, he had not established a substantial relationship with the child and had not seized his interest.

---

54 The statutory scheme in existence at the time of the *Steve B.D.* decision was completely revised in 2000.
in any other cognizable way. Thus, the Court concluded that the father’s consent was not needed for the adoption.

Interestingly, the Idaho Court, while relying on Lehr, did not review the constitutional sufficiency of the Idaho statutory scheme for notice of adoption and TPR proceedings. Instead, the Court focused on the quality of the father’s relationship with the child. It is not clear whether the scheme in force at the time was constitutionally sufficient.

The Idaho Supreme Court next addressed the rights of unwed fathers in Johnson v. Studley-Preston. In Johnson, the Court reversed the trial court’s holding that an unwed father lacked standing to file a paternity action because he had failed to establish a substantial relationship with the child. The Supreme Court held that the adoption notice provisions regarding putative fathers only applied to limit paternity claims where such claims arise in connection with an adoption or termination of parental rights case. In Johnson, no action for adoption or TPR had been filed. Instead, after the mother left her relationship with the unwed biological father and married another man, the unwed biological father sought to establish his parental relationship by seeking an order of paternity. Further, the Court held that although the mother of the child was married at the time of the child’s birth, the child was, nonetheless, a “child born out of wedlock” for purposes of the paternity statute because the mother was not married to the biological father. Thus, the unwed biological father’s paternity action was not barred by his failure to register in the putative father registry and was properly filed under the provisions of the paternity statute.

In Roe Family Services v. Doe (Doe 2004), the Court addressed the requirements for notice to an unwed father under the TPR statute. It held that an unmarried biological father recorded on the birth certificate as the child’s father was entitled to notice of a TPR proceeding pursuant to the TPR statute. That provision (now Idaho Code § 16-2007) required then, and still requires today, that notice be provided to any person included in the adoption notice provision – Idaho Code § 16-1505. Thus, the Court concluded that the unmarried father, listed on the birth certificate, was entitled to notice of the TPR proceeding. Furthermore, the Court held that where the mother and the father both acknowledged the father’s paternity, the father’s action should not be barred by his failure to register in the putative father registry pursuant to Idaho Code § 16-1513.

In Doe I 2005, the Supreme Court held that an unmarried, biological father was not a parent whose rights must be terminated because he had not established paternity, had not filed a Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity, and had not established a relationship with his child. In Doe I 2005, the mother was married at the time the child was born. The husband was listed as the father of the child on the

birth certificate and thereafter held himself out and functioned as the child’s father in every way. Several years later, during a pending divorce action, the husband learned that he was not the father of the child. Nonetheless, the magistrate in the divorce case found that the husband was the presumed father of the child by virtue of his marriage to the mother, and the Court gave full custody to the husband. In response to the award of custody, the mother contacted the biological father of the child and urged him to obtain a paternity test and to pursue his parental rights. To secure his relationship with the child, the husband then filed an action to terminate the parental rights of the unmarried biological father. The unwed father was named as the defendant, was notified of the action, and participated in it.

In Doe I 2005, the Court reasoned that the parental termination statute was premised on the assumption that the “defendant parent has some parental right to his or her child, which should be terminated….”59 Based on the facts of the case and on both Idaho and U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the court held that the biological father did not have such a parental right. It reasoned that to have parental rights a father must 1) establish paternity through a court decree, 2) file a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity, or 3) his consent to an adoption must be required pursuant to the adoption statute.60 The unmarried biological father had not established paternity, had not filed a Voluntary Acknowledgment, nor had he established any relationship with the child. The Court reasoned that its holding was consistent with both Steve B.D. and with Lehr v. Robinson. Based on those cases, it rejected the biological father’s argument that he had not established paternity because the mother lied to him and told him that the child was not his. The Court reasoned that the father had plenty of time and opportunity to question the mother’s representations and to seek to establish his relationship with the child, but had not done so.

In Doe II 2010,61 the factual situation was similar to Doe I 2005. The mother was married at the time of the child’s birth to a person who was not the biological father of the child. While the mother was pregnant, the biological father was sent to prison. Mother told the biological father that he might be the father of the child and he made inquiries into the possibility of establishing paternity. However, he never pursued any formal steps to establish paternity. Prior to the biological father’s release from prison, the child and her siblings were removed from the care of the mother and her husband by IDHW, and a child protective case was initiated. The husband was listed as the father of the child in the CPA proceeding. The Department became aware of the biological father at some point during the case and attempted to contact him in Walla Walla, where he lived after his release from prison. He did not respond. The child was not reunified with the mother, and the Department filed a TPR proceeding.

59 Id. at 204, 127 P. 3d at 107
60 As discussed previously, the following men must consent to an adoption: 1) the man married to the mother at birth or conception; 2) a man who has established paternity through a court decree; 3) a man who has filed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity; or 4) a man who has established a sufficiently close relationship with the child as defined in the adoption statute.
61 Do I 2010, 150 Idaho 88, 244 P. 3d 232 (2010).
against the mother, her husband, and the biological father. Relying on Doe I 2005, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate’s finding that the biological father did not have parental rights that required termination. Although he had a paternity test, he never filed a paternity action. Nor did the biological father file a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity. Finally, the court reasoned that the biological father’s two brief contacts and payment of a very small amount of support did not establish a sufficient relationship to constitute a parental right that must be terminated. The Court concluded that the father’s due process rights were not violated, relying on Doe I 2005, Caban, Lehr, and Steve B.D.

In Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe (Doe III 2010), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a man who believed that he was the child’s father and who had resided with the child and the child’s mother, was not a “father” whose rights had to be terminated prior to an adoptive placement. In Doe II 2010, paternity testing during the child protective proceeding revealed that Doe was not the biological father of the child. He argued that he had standing to participate in the proceeding and to object to the termination of his parental rights. His theory was that he was a “presumed father” under Idaho Code § 16-2002(12), or that, in the alternative, he should be considered a parent under the equitable doctrine of in loco parentis. Although Doe believed he was the father, had resided with the child and the child’s mother as a family unit, and had actively participated in the child’s case plan, he had never married the mother. The court held that Doe did not meet the definition of “presumptive father” because he never married the child’s mother. Further, the court declined to extend the doctrine of in loco parent to the facts of the case. Thus, it affirmed the magistrate’s conclusion that Doe was not a father and that he did not have standing to object to the termination of parental rights. Finally, the court concluded that Doe’s constitutional rights to access the courts and to due process were not impaired by the court’s conclusion. Regarding access to the courts, the Court pointed out that Doe had been permitted to fully participate in the proceeding on the issue of whether he was the child’s father. Regarding due process, the Court concluded that Doe did not have a cognizable liberty interest because he was not the biological parent of the child. It reasoned, “[t]his Court declines to recognize a liberty interest in this case. No jurisdiction has identified a liberty interest in a non-biological person who is neither a legal guardian, adoptive parent, step-parent, bold relative, nor foster parent.”

Despite the Court’s frequent consideration of issues regarding notice of unwed fathers, it has never had the opportunity to evaluate the constitutionality of the current adoption and parental termination notice provisions. Rather, the Idaho Court has evaluated the quality of an unwed father’s relationship to determine whether he has established a constitutionally sufficient interest to challenge a TPR proceeding or adoption. In each of the Idaho cases, with the exception Steve B.D. and Doe 2004, the unmarried father had received notice and was permitted to participate in proceedings for the purpose of determining whether his relationship with the child warranted recognition. Steve B.D. was decided prior to the current notice provisions.

---

63 Id. at 200, 245 P. 3d at 511.
In *Doe 2004*, the court did not reach the constitutional question because it found that the Idaho TPR statute required that the father be notified.

### E. Best Practice Recommendations in CPA Proceedings Based on the Idaho Statutory Scheme

Based on the Idaho statutory scheme, the following individuals should be notified of a CPA proceeding. This recommendation, which attempts to harmonize the disparate provisions of the statutes discussed above, is made because such individuals may become integral to the case at any of its stages (removal and legal custody, TPR, and adoption), and failure to notify them may cause delays in permanency for the child:

- The man married to the mother at the time the child is conceived or born.
- Any man who has been adjudicated the father by a court of competent jurisdiction.
- Any man who has, with the mother, signed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity.
- Any man who is able to demonstrate that he has maintained a substantial relationship, as defined in § 16-1504(2), with a child who is more than 6 months of age.
- Any man who has lived with the child for at least six months, within the first year after the child’s birth and immediately preceding the initiation of an adoption proceeding, and who has openly held himself out as the father of the child.
- Any man who, prior to the child’s placement for adoption, has commenced a paternity proceeding, and who has filed a notice of commencement of paternity proceedings and an affidavit of support and care for the child.
- Any man who is recorded on the birth certificate as the father of the child with the knowledge and consent of the mother.
- Any man who is openly living in the household with the child at the time the mother’s consent to adoption is executed and who holds himself out as the father of the child.
- Any man who resides in another state and who may not have had the opportunity to perfect his parental rights.

*   *   *
12.4 THE IDAHO SAFE HAVEN STATUTE

In 2001, Idaho adopted the Idaho Safe Haven Act. Similar statutes have been enacted in most states as a response to reported instances of infanticide and the abandonment of infants. The Idaho Safe Haven Act is codified in Title 39, Chapter 82 of the Idaho Code. The Act permits a parent to safely relinquish a baby to a designated location where the baby will be protected and cared for until a permanent home can be found. The law permits the parent to remain anonymous and be shielded from prosecution for abandonment or neglect. It also establishes procedures to secure permanency for the child.

A. Who May Leave a Baby at a Safe Haven

A custodial parent may deliver a child to a safe haven in Idaho. Pursuant to the Act, the custodial parent is the parent with whom the child resides. A child left at a safe haven must be no more than 30 days of age at the time it is left at the safe haven. If a custodial parent leaves a child at a safe haven, the parent is not subject to prosecution for abandonment.

B. Save Havens

In Idaho, safe havens authorized to receive a child pursuant to the Safe Haven Act, include: Idaho licensed hospitals or physicians, staff working at a licensed office or clinic, Idaho licensed or registered advanced practice professional nurses and physician assistants, emergency medical personnel responding to a “911” call from a custodial parent, or fire stations.

C. Responsibility of Safe Havens

If a safe haven takes custody of a child, it has a number of responsibilities under the Act. The safe haven must “perform any act necessary in accordance with generally accepted standards of professional practice, to protect, preserve, or aid the physical health and safety of the child during the temporary physical custody, including but not limited to, delivering the child to a hospital for care or treatment.” The safe haven also is required to “provide notice of the abandonment to a peace officer or other person appointed by the court.”

The safe haven may not “inquire as to the identity of the custodial parent.” Moreover, if the identity of the parent is known to the safe haven, it must “keep all information as to the identity confidential.” In addition, the parent cannot be
required to provide “any information” to the safe haven, although the safe haven may collect information voluntarily offered by the parent.\(^{73}\)

A safe haven exercising its responsibilities under the statute is immune from civil or criminal liability “that otherwise might result from their actions,” so long as the safe haven is acting in good faith in receiving the child and performing its duties.\(^{74}\)

**D. Permanency for the Relinquished Child**

Once a peace officer or other person designated by the court is notified by a safe haven that it has taken custody of a child, the officer must take protective custody of the child and immediately deliver the child to the care, control, and custody of the Department of Health and Welfare. If the child needs further medical care, the child may be left in the care of a hospital and the peace officer must notify the court and the prosecutor of the child’s location.\(^{75}\)

Once the child is delivered to the Department, the Department must “place the abandoned child with a potential adoptive parent as soon as possible.”\(^{76}\)

The Safe Haven Act provides that a shelter care hearing must be held pursuant to Idaho Code § 16-1615, and that the *Department* must file a “petition for adjudicatory hearing pursuant to Idaho Code § 16-1621.”\(^{77}\) The process envisioned by these provisions is ambiguous.

Idaho Code § 16-1615 requires a shelter care hearing to be held within 48 hours of a child’s emergency removal from the home pursuant to the Child Protective Act (CPA). Presumably, the Safe Haven Act anticipates that the shelter care hearing in a safe haven case should take place within 48 hours of the child’s relinquishment to a safe haven, although this timing is not specified in the Act. As a matter of best practice to ensure the safety of the child, the appropriateness of the safe haven’s actions, and to begin the investigation into the other parent of the child, the shelter care hearing should be held within 48 hours of the time the child is left at the safe haven.

A second ambiguity in the Safe Haven Act is the cross reference to Idaho Code § 16-1621 regarding the filing of a petition and the adjudicatory hearing. Idaho Code Section 16-1621 is the Case Plan Hearing section of the CPA. Presumably, this cross reference should refer to the CPA provision regarding the CPA petition – Idaho Code § 16-1610 – and/or the provisions of the CPA regarding the adjudicatory hearing – Idaho Code § 16-1619.

---

\(^{73}\) *Id.*

\(^{74}\) I.C. § 39-8203(4).

\(^{75}\) I.C. § 39-8204(1). The Safe Haven Act further provides that the peace officer or other authorized person acting pursuant to the statute will not be held liable unless “the action of taking custody of the child was exercised in bad faith.” I.C. § 39-8204(3).

\(^{76}\) I.C. § 39-8204(2).

\(^{77}\) I.C. § 39-8205.
A third ambiguity is that the Safe Haven Act requires that the Department file a CPA petition. The CPA provides that either the county prosecutor or a deputy attorney general – not the Department – file the petition in a CPA case. The best practice is for the Department to consult with the prosecutor, who can then file the petition at the time of the shelter care hearing as provided for in the CPA.

The Safe Haven Act requires that an adjudicatory hearing must be held pursuant to Idaho Code § 16-1619 and § 16-1621. This section repeats the confusing cross reference to the CPA Case Plan Hearing provision (§ 16-1621), but also directly cross-references the CPA adjudicatory hearing provision. The adjudicatory hearing in a safe haven case should be held within 30 days after the petition is filed. Within the initial 30 days after the safe haven assumes custody of the infant, the Department is also required to conduct an investigation to ensure that the infant is not a missing child and may, if ordered by the court, initiate a child protective or criminal investigation if a claim of parental rights has been made. In addition, the Department must conduct the investigations required by the CPA.

As soon as practicable, after the first 30 days in which the child is in custody, the Department must petition to terminate the parental rights of the parent who abandoned the child and of any absent parent. No further procedures are set forth in the Safe Haven Act itself. The inference is that the case should proceed as a typical CPA proceeding to the final adoptive placement of the child. This proceeding is likely to be truncated because the parents of the child are not participating in the action. Also, the Safe Haven Act seems to anticipate that the permanent placement for a safe haven child is adoption.

E. Parental Rights

Care must be taken to respect the parental rights of the absent parent in a Safe Haven Act proceeding. Two potential issues could arise regarding the rights of that parent that can affect the stability of the child’s placement.

1. Constitutional Rights of Parents

The absent parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in establishing a relationship with the child. Both federal and state law regarding the nature and scope of this liberty interest are discussed in the section of this chapter regarding the rights of unwed fathers.

2. Indian Child Welfare Act

---

78 I.C. § 16-1610(1)(a).
79 I.C. § 39-8205(4).
80 I.C. § 39-8205(3).
81 I.C. § 39-8205(2).
If the child is an Indian Child, any adoption may be void if the provisions of ICWA are not complied with. Chapter 11 of this manual contains a detailed discussion of ICWA. Care must be taken in a safe haven case to ensure that the child’s status as an Indian Child is investigated. Although there is no case law on this point, it is likely the federal requirements of ICWA would prevail; that the state’s duty to determine the child’s status under ICWA pre-empts inconsistent state laws providing that inquiry into the parents’ identity and background cannot be made. This direct statutory clash between state and federal law poses serious issues where there is any indication that the child may be an Indian child.

3. Procedural Requirements of the Safe Haven Act to Protect Parental Rights

a. Registration in the Abandoned Child Registry and Notice

The Safe Haven Act contains some provisions aimed at protecting the parental rights of the absent parent. Although the act specifically disallows inquiry into the identity of the custodial parent, it provides that during the first 30 days the child is in custody, “the department shall request assistance from law enforcement officials to investigate through the missing children information clearinghouse and other state and national resources to ensure that the child is not a missing child.”

The Act also provides that the vital statistics unit of the Department must maintain a “missing children’s registry” where a parent may make a claim of parental rights of an abandoned child. To be effective, the Act provides that a claim of parental rights must be filed before an order terminating parental rights is entered by a court. The Act states that “[a] parent that fails to file a claim of parental rights prior to entry of an order termination their parental rights is deemed to have abandoned the child and waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child, including the right to any judicial proceeding in connection with the termination of parental rights or adoption of the child.” Prior to a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights, the Department must file a certificate from the Department of Vital Statistics stating that a diligent search of the missing children registry was conducted and setting forth the results of the search or stating that no claim of parental rights was made.

The Safe Haven Act specifically provides that registration of notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings pursuant to Idaho Code § 16-1513 does not satisfy the requirements of the Safe Haven Act. Given that unwed parents have a constitutional right to parent their children, this provision may be of
doubtful constitutionality. The federal and state cases regarding parental rights are discussed in the unwed fathers section of this chapter. For example, an unwed father who resided with the mother and supported her during her pregnancy, who timely filed pursuant to Idaho Code § 16-1513, but did not file a claim of parental rights of an abandoned child pursuant to the Safe Haven Act, might nonetheless be constitutionally entitled to notice of an action terminating parental rights or an adoption action. Likewise, a father who lived together in a family unit with the child’s mother and the child after the child’s birth, albeit briefly, also would likely be constitutionally entitled to notice even despite failing to file the claim of parental rights required by the Safe Haven Act.

b. Filing a claim of parental rights

If a claim of parental rights is timely filed, notice of the action to terminate parental rights must be provided to the person claiming parental rights pursuant to Idaho Code § 16-2007 (the TPR statute). In addition, the court must hold the action of involuntary termination of parental rights “in abeyance” for a period not to exceed 60 days.89

During the 60-day period of abeyance, the court must order genetic tests to establish maternity or paternity at the expense of the person claiming parental rights. In addition, the act directs the Department to conduct an investigation pursuant to Idaho Code § 16-2008.90

When indicated, a shelter care hearing must be conducted within 48 hours to determine whether the child should remain in the custody of the Department or should be returned to the parent. Presumably, this shelter care hearing is in addition to the shelter care hearing that was conducted when the child was initially abandoned and hearing must be held within 48 hours of the filing of a claim of parental rights, although the statute does not state how the time requirement should be implemented.91 In making a determination regarding whether to return the child to the parent, continue a CPA proceeding, or terminate parental rights, the act provides that “a parent shall not be found to have neglected or abandoned a child” solely because the child was left at a safe haven.92

* * *

89 I.C. § 39-8206(3).
90 I.C. § 39-8306(3)(a) and (b). The referenced investigation includes a financial analysis regarding unreimbursed public assistance provided on behalf of the child. In addition, the section directs that a social study of the circumstances of the child and the case be conducted. I.C. § 16-2008.
91 I.C. § 39-8206(3)(c).
12.5 DEFACTO CUSTODIANS AND CHILD PROTECTIVE ACT PROCEEDINGS

In 2009, the Idaho Legislature enacted the De Facto Custodian Act. This statute provides a procedural mechanism by which a relative of a child may obtain an order of legal or physical custody of the child.

If a de facto custodian has been appointed for a child prior to the removal of the child from the home, the custodian is a proper party to the CPA proceeding. In addition, depending on the facts of the case, the custodian may be considered as a possible resource for the child during the CPA proceeding.

However, where a de facto custodian has not been appointed by a court prior to the initiation of the CPA proceeding, this statute does not provide a basis for the alleged custodian to participate as a party in the CPA proceeding or to use a CPA placement as a bootstrap for a legal order of custody.

The De Facto Custodian Act, itself, makes clear that that a person cannot qualify as a de facto custodian based on a placement made pursuant to the CPA. Thus, placement of the child with a relative as part of a CPA proceeding cannot provide a basis for the relative to seek appointment as a de facto custodian.

The CPA provides that the court in the CPA proceeding has exclusive jurisdiction of the matter. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide that proceedings filed under Title 16 of the Idaho Code (including adoptions, child protective act proceedings, and parental termination actions) are not “child custody proceedings” in which an individual may intervene to seek appointment as a de facto custodian.

*  *  *

---

94 I.C. § 16-1602(16) defines the term “custodian” as “a person, other than a parent or legal guardian to whom legal or joint legal custody of the child has been given by a court order.” This definition would include a de facto custodian who has been awarded legal custody. A custodian must be identified in the CPA petition with specificity, I.C. § 16-1610(2)(d), is to be notified of the CPA proceeding in the Summons, I.C. § 16-1611(3), and must receive notice of the shelter care hearing, I.C. § 16-1615(2). See I.C. §§ 16-1602(12) (Supp. 2014), 16-1610(2)(d), and 16-1611(3)(2009).
97 I.R.C.P. 24(d).
12.6 FINDINGS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH AND/OR MAINTAIN A CHILD’S ELIGIBILITY FOR IV-E FUNDING

In order for an Idaho child placed in foster care to establish and maintain eligibility to receive federal IV-E foster care maintenance payments, the judge hearing the child protection case must make specific findings at specific times in the child protection case. This section is designed to review the specific findings, their language, and the timing of each throughout the child protective process.

A. Contrary to the Welfare

The first order pertaining to the removal of the child from the home must contain a finding that it would be contrary to the welfare of the child to remain in the home. Failure to make this finding will cause an otherwise eligible child to be ineligible for federal foster care maintenance payments as well as adoption assistance funds.

The first order pertaining to the removal of a child from the home could be:

1. Initial detention orders in juvenile corrections cases
2. Idaho Juvenile Rule 16 expansion orders
3. Orders of removal
4. Orders that continue shelter care hearings to another date
5. Orders issued at shelter care hearings that place the children in shelter care, based on the stipulation of the parties
6. Orders issued at shelter care hearings that place the children in shelter care, based upon the evidence presented
7. Orders issued at adjudicatory hearings that place the children in the custody of the IDHW, based upon the stipulation of the parties
8. Orders issued at adjudicatory hearings that place the children in the custody of IDHW, based upon the evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing
9. Orders issued at an amended disposition hearing (for example, a child is removed from home after having been placed in the home under protective supervision) or
10. Orders issued at a review hearing or a 12-month permanency hearing, if the child is removed from the home at that time.

---

98 I.J.R. 16.
99 I.C. § 16-1611(4).
100 I.C. § 16-1615.
101 Id.
102 Id.
104 Id.
105 I.C. § 16-1623.
106 I.C. § 16-1622.
107 I.C. § 16-1622(2)(b).
1. **Finding**

The judge hearing a child protection case must make a finding that it would be “contrary to the welfare of the child to remain in the home.”

2. **Timing**

Federal law requires this finding to be made in the first order pertaining to the removal of the child from the home. Idaho Code § 16-1615(5)(d) requires that the “contrary to the welfare finding” be made at the shelter care hearing and Idaho Code § 16-1619(6) requires that the “contrary to the welfare” finding be made at the adjudicatory hearing.

If the child has been removed from the home, the shelter care hearing is continued, and custody of the child is mentioned in any way, the contrary to the welfare finding must be made at that hearing.

3. **Corrective Action**

If the “contrary to the welfare” determination is not made in the first court order pertaining to the child’s removal from the home, an otherwise eligible child will be rendered ineligible for Title IV-E foster care maintenance payments for the duration of that stay in foster care. Additionally, the child will also likely be ineligible for federal adoption assistance payments.

If the “contrary to the welfare” finding was made but omitted from the resulting order, the court may attach a copy of the relevant portion of the transcript to a copy of the original order and return a copy of the original order with the transcript to the office of the Department of Health and Welfare handling the case. This will reinstate the child’s eligibility.

**B. Reasonable Efforts to Prevent Removal**

1. **Finding**

A judicial determination must be made as to whether or not the Department made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child from her/his home.

2. **Timing**

---

109 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(c) (2011).
110 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(c) (2011).
111 Id.
112 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(d)(1).
Under federal law, the reasonable efforts to prevent removal finding must be made **no later than sixty (60) days from the date the child was removed from home**. Idaho law requires that the “reasonable efforts to prevent removal” finding be made at the shelter care and, if the court vests legal custody in the Department, at the adjudicatory hearing as well. The adjudicatory hearing may not be continued to a date more than 60 days from the date of removal unless the court has made case specific, written, reasonable efforts to prevent removal findings.

3. **Corrective Action**

Federal Law provides that “[i]f the determination concerning reasonable efforts to prevent the removal is not made as specified in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section, an otherwise eligible child is not eligible under Title IV-E foster care maintenance payments program for the duration of the child’s stay in foster care.”

If the “reasonable efforts to prevent removal” finding was not made, or was incorrectly made, **and less than 60 days have elapsed from the date of removal**, federal regulations recognize a subsequent reasonable efforts finding but do not allow the finding to be made in an amended order. A new hearing must be held and the finding timely made in an order issued as a result of the new hearing. Federal regulations, the Idaho Child Protective Act, and the Idaho Juvenile Rules are silent regarding a process for scheduling a hearing for this purpose.

If the “reasonable efforts to prevent removal” finding was made at a hearing, but omitted from the resulting order, the court may attach a copy of the relevant portion of the transcript to a copy of the original order and return the order with attached transcript to the office of the Department of Health and Welfare handling the case. This will reinstate the child’s eligibility.

C. **Removal from Protective Supervision**

1. **Finding and Timing**

When the child returns home under protective supervision, the Department relinquishes custody of the child and custody of the child is returned to the parent(s). If the child is ultimately returned to care, it is treated as a new removal and the “contrary to the welfare” and “reasonable efforts to prevent removal” findings must be made at the amended disposition hearing.

2. **Corrective Action**

If the contrary to the welfare finding is not made in the first order of removal, which could be an order of removal or the order resulting from the amended disposition hearing, an otherwise eligible child will be rendered ineligible for Title IV-E foster care maintenance payments for the

---

114 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(1)(i) and (ii); I.C. §§ 16-1615(5)(b) (2009), § 16-1619(6)(a-c) (Supp. 2014).
115 I.J.R. 41(b).
116 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(1)(i) and (ii) (2011).
duration of the child’s stay in foster care. Additionally, the child will likely be ineligible for adoption assistance payments.\footnote{45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(c).}

If the “contrary to the welfare” finding was made at the amended disposition hearing, but omitted from the resulting order, the court may attach a copy of the relevant portion of the transcript to a copy of the original order and return a copy of the original order with the transcript to the office of the Department of Health and Welfare handling the case. This will reinstate the child’s eligibility.\footnote{45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(d)(1) (2011).}

If the “reasonable efforts to prevent removal” finding was not made, or was incorrectly made, \textit{and less than sixty (60) days have elapsed from the date of removal}, federal regulations recognize a subsequent reasonable efforts finding but do not allow the finding to be made in an amended order. A new hearing must be held and the finding timely made in an order issued as a result of the new hearing. Federal regulations, the Idaho Child Protective Act, and the Idaho Juvenile Rules are silent in regard to a process for scheduling a hearing for this purpose.

If the “reasonable efforts to prevent removal” finding was made at a hearing, but omitted from the resulting order, the court may attach a copy of the relevant portion of the transcript to a copy of the original order and return the order with attached transcript to the office of the Department of Health and Welfare handling the case. This will reinstate the child’s eligibility.

\textbf{D. Extended Home Visit}

1. \textbf{Finding and Timing}

When a child is returned home on an extended home visit, the Department retains custody of the child, and the “contrary to the welfare” and “reasonable efforts to prevent removal” findings need be made only if the child is returned to care after a home visit that exceeds six months without prior court approval.\footnote{45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(e).}

2. \textbf{Corrective Action}

If the contrary to the welfare finding is not made in the first order of removal, which could be an Order of Removal or the order resulting from the amended disposition hearing, an otherwise eligible child will be rendered ineligible for Title IV-E foster care maintenance payments for the duration of the child’s stay in foster care. Additionally, the child will likely be ineligible for adoption assistance payments.\footnote{45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(c).}

If the “contrary to the welfare” finding was made at the amended disposition hearing, but omitted from the resulting order, the court may attach a copy of the relevant portion of the
transcript to a copy of the original order and return a copy of the original order with the transcript to the office of the Department of Health and Welfare handling the case. This will reinstate the child’s eligibility.122

If the “reasonable efforts to prevent removal” finding was not made, or was incorrectly made, and less than sixty (60) days have elapsed from the date of removal, federal regulations recognize a subsequent reasonable efforts finding but do not allow the finding to be made in an amended order. A new hearing must be held and the finding timely made in an order issued as a result of the new hearing. Federal regulations, the Idaho Child Protective Act, and the Idaho Juvenile Rules are silent regarding a process for scheduling a hearing for this purpose.

If the “reasonable efforts to prevent removal” finding was made at a hearing, but omitted from the resulting order, the court may attach a copy of the relevant portion of the transcript to a copy of the original order and return the order with attached transcript to the office of the Department of Health and Welfare handling the case. This will reinstate the child’s eligibility.

E. Reasonable Efforts to Finalize the Permanency Plan

1. Finding

A judicial determination must be made as to whether the Department did or did not make reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan that was in effect. The finding must be a retrospective review of the efforts made by the Department to finalize the permanency plan that is in effect.123 Idaho law requires that, after the permanency hearing, the court make “written case-specific findings” as to whether the “[D]epartment made reasonable efforts to finalize the primary permanency goal in effect for the child.”124

2. Timing

This finding must be made within 12 months of the date the child is considered to have entered foster care and at least once every 12 months thereafter. A child is considered to have entered foster care on the earlier of the date of the first judicial finding that the child has been subjected to child abuse or neglect or the date that is 60 calendar days after the date on which the child is removed from the home. A state may use a date earlier than that required by federal regulations.125

Idaho law requires that the hearing to review the permanency plan be held prior to 12 months from the date the child is removed from the home or the date of the court’s order taking jurisdiction under this chapter, whichever occurs first.126

122 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(d)(1).
123 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(a)(i) and (ii).
124 I.C. § 16-1622(2)(b) (Supp. 2014); I.J.R. 46(c).
125 45 C.F.R. §§ 1355.20, 1356.21(b)(2)(i) and (ii).
126 I.C. § 16-1622(2)(b).
Federal policy regarding the failure to make this finding and the ability to quickly reinstate such funding is as follows: “If such a judicial determination regarding reasonable efforts to finalize a permanency plan is not made in accordance with the schedule prescribed in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section (45 C.F.R. § 1356.21), the child becomes ineligible under title IV-E at the end of the month in which the judicial determination was required to have been made, and remains ineligible unless such a determination is subsequently made. The eligibility recommences the first day of the month the finding is eventually made.”

3. **Corrective Action**

   a. **Problem:** Twelve (12) month permanency plan hearing not held on time.

      **Action:** Schedule and hold the permanency review hearing at the earliest possible date.

   b. **Problem:** Twelve (12) month permanency plan hearing was held, but no (or incorrect) “reasonable efforts to finalize the primary permanency goal in effect” finding is made.

      **Action:** If the “reasonable efforts to finalize the primary permanency goal in effect” finding was made at a hearing, but omitted from the resulting order, the court may attach a copy of the relevant portion of the transcript to the original order and return the order with attached transcript to the office of the Department of Health and Welfare handling the case. This will reinstate the child’s eligibility.

      If the “reasonable efforts to finalize the primary permanency goal in effect” finding was not made, or was incorrectly made, the finding must be made. The “reasonable efforts to finalize the primary permanency goal in effect” finding can be made by the court upon evidence presented to it by the state without a formal hearing. This finding can be made from the bench or from chambers based on testimony. If the “reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan” finding is not made, not made within the mandated time frame, or made but the language of the finding is incorrect, IV-E funding will end on the last day of the month which is 12 months from the date of removal. The IV-E funding will be restored on the first day of the month in which the permanency hearing is held and the “reasonable efforts to finalize the primary permanency goal in effect plan” finding is made.

F. **Placement and Care Authority**

The state IV-E agency must have placement and care authority in order to be eligible for federal IV-E funding. Although placement and care authority is generally associated with legal custody

---

127 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(2)(ii).
there is no absolute federal requirement that legal custody be vested in the agency in order for the child to be eligible for IV-E funding. Legal custody may be translated to mean placement and care authority.\textsuperscript{129}

If the court orders a child into a specific placement setting, facility, home, or institution, this action may be considered to have usurped the IV-E agency’s authority for placement and care, thus making the child ineligible for federal IV-E funding.\textsuperscript{130} When the court’s order merely names the child’s placement as an endorsement or approval, or generally references of the agency’s choice, eligibility for IV-E funding is not precluded.\textsuperscript{131}

Federal IV-E guidelines do not require that the court always concur with the agency’s recommendation regarding placement. The IV-E guidelines state that the court may take testimony and after hearing such testimony or recommendations, including that from IV-E representatives and/or others, the court may accept such recommendations and name a specific placement in its order. In all such situations, the court should make it clear that the designation of the specific facility is based upon the evidence presented at the hearing and upon a bona fide consideration of the agency’s recommendation regarding placement.\textsuperscript{132}

\textbf{G. Required Findings at Permanency and Review Hearing for Children and Youth in Foster Care and for APPLA Placements}

In 2014, Congress passed the Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act.\textsuperscript{133} This Act limits the use of APPLA as a permanency goal to youth age sixteen and older and also imposes requirements on agencies and courts aimed at improving foster care placements for children and youth.\textsuperscript{134} The requirements discussed below are effective in September 2015 (one year from the date of enactment). Because the legislation is so recent, implementing regulations have not been adopted by the Department of Health and Human Services although the Administration for Children, Youth, and Families has released an “Information Memorandum”\textsuperscript{135} regarding the legislation.

\textbf{1. APPLA Placements}

Where the permanency goal for a youth sixteen or older is APPLA, the new federal law requires that IDHW document at each permanency hearing:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{130} 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g) (3).
\item \textsuperscript{131} 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(B); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g)(3).
\item \textsuperscript{133} 42 U.S.C. §675.
\item \textsuperscript{134} 42 U.S.C. §675.
\end{itemize}
The efforts to place the youth permanently with a parent, relative, or in a guardianship or adoptive placement.\textsuperscript{136}

The foster family follows the “reasonable and prudent parent standard” when making decisions regarding their foster child(ren). This Act defines the standard as the standard characterized by careful and sensible parental decisions that maintain a child’s health, safety and best interests while at the same time encouraging a child’s emotional and developmental growth.\textsuperscript{137}

The child has regular opportunities to engage in “age or developmentally appropriate activities.” Age and developmentally appropriate activities are defined as suitable, developmentally appropriate activities of children of a certain age or maturity level based on the capabilities typical for the age group and the individual child.\textsuperscript{138}

In addition, at each permanency hearing, the judge must ask the youth about her or his desired permanency outcome. The court must make a finding that APPLA is the best permanency plan for the child and that there are compelling reasons why it is not in the child’s best interests to be placed with a parent, relative, or in a guardianship or adoptive placement.\textsuperscript{139}

2. Youth Transitioning to Adulthood

Finally, the act requires that the case plan and permanency hearing must describe the services to help youth transition to successful adulthood.\textsuperscript{140}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{136} 42 U.S.C. § 675A(a)(1).
\item\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Id.} at (10)(A).
\item\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Id.} at (11)(A).
\item\textsuperscript{139} 42 U.S.C. § 675A(a)(2)(B).
\item\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Id.} at §§ (1)(B),(1)(D),(5)(C)(i) and (5)(C)(iii).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
12.7 INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN

A. Introduction

The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) is the best means to ensure protection of and services to children who are placed across state lines for foster care or adoption. The Compact is both an interstate agreement and a uniform law that has been enacted by all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. It establishes orderly procedures for the interstate placement of children and fixes responsibility for those involved in placing the child. Provisions of the Compact ensure the same protection and services to children as if they had remained in their home state. The compact contains 10 Articles and 13 Regulations. The Association of Administrators of the ICPC (“AAICPC”) promulgates regulations.

Although the ICPC includes private adoptions and placements for residential care, the majority of Idaho ICPC cases involve children in foster care. According to statistics provided and maintained by IDHW’s ICPC Compact Administrator, each year, Idaho processes between 1,000-1,100 total ICPC requests, with the majority being public cases. From those ICPC requests, about 300 placements are made from other states with Idaho families, and roughly 200 placements are made from Idaho public agencies with out-of-state families.

The ICPC has been the subject of much criticism in recent years. In 2009, AAICPC proposed revisions to the ICPC. These revisions were controversial and have only been adopted in 10 states. Idaho has not adopted the revisions. The AAICPC has published a side-by-side comparison of the original ICPC and the new ICPC and maintains information on which states have adopted the new compact.

B. Goals of the ICPC

1. Safety
The ICPC provides the sending agency\textsuperscript{144} the opportunity to obtain home studies in the receiving state prior to placement of the child. Originally, prospective receiving state were asked to ensure that the placement was not “contrary to the best interests of the child” and that all applicable laws and policies are followed before it approved the placement. However, in 2013, the AAICPC asked ICPC administrators to review how parents were being evaluated in home studies and to carefully scrutinize denials for parent placement requests. Compact administrators were asked to work within their respective states to apply the standard for placement approval of “Would placement with the parent be detrimental to the child?” rather than the previous contrary to the best interests standard. Parent denials should be based on clear and identifiable safety issues or the inability of a parent to meet a child’s basic needs. If a parent can meet minimum sufficient levels of care standards, placement with a parent should be approved.

2. **Permanency and Well-Being**

The ICPC guarantees the child’s legal and financial protection once the child moves to the receiving state.\textsuperscript{145} The receiving agency agrees to provide supervision and send regular reports on the child’s adjustment and progress in the placement to the sending agency and ensures the sending state does not lose jurisdiction over the child.\textsuperscript{146}

**C. Situations Where the ICPC Applies**

The core provision of the ICPC establishes that:

No sending agency shall send, bring or cause to be sent or brought into any other party state, any child for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the sending agency shall comply with each and every requirement set forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the receiving state governing the placement of children therein.\textsuperscript{147}

Pursuant to this provision and the definitions in Article II of the Compact, the ICPC applies to the following situations where the child is being placed from one state to another:

- Children who are within the custody of the Department (or in a parallel arrangement in another state) and who are being placed with a parent or relative when a parent or relative is not making the placement.
- Children who are entering foster care or a placement for the purpose of adoption.

\textsuperscript{144} I.C. § 16-2102, Art. III(b) (“Sending agency” is defined in the ICPC as “a party state, officer or employee thereof; a subdivision of a party state, or officer or employee thereof; a person, corporation, association, charitable agency or other entity which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought, any child to another party state.”).

\textsuperscript{145} I.C. § 16-2102, Art. II(c) (“Receiving state” is defined in the ICPC as “the state to which a child is sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought, whether by public authorities or private persons or agencies, and whether for placement with state or local authorities or for placement with private agencies or persons.”).

\textsuperscript{146} I.C. § 16-2102, Art. V.

\textsuperscript{147} I.C. § 16-2102, Art. III(a).
• Children who are within the custody of the Department (or in a parallel arrangement in another state) for placement in a group home and/or residential treatment facility.
• Children who are to be placed in a group home and/or residential treatment facility by a legal guardian.
• Children who are placed by a legal guardian with a person outside of the third degree of relationship, i.e. child’s second cousin.
• Children who are adjudicated delinquents for placement in a group home and/or residential treatment facility.  

The Compact does not apply to placement of children in an institution that cares for the “mentally ill, mentally defective or for individuals with epilepsy, or an institution that is primarily educational in character, and/or a hospital or other medical facility.”

D. Placement and Maintaining Jurisdiction

Under the compact, the sending state must provide written notice to the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state of “the intention to send, bring, or place the child in the receiving state.” The notice must contain: 1) the name, date and place of birth of the child; 2) the identity and address(es) of the parents or legal guardians of the child; 3) the name and address of the person, agency or institution to which the sending agency proposes to send the child; and 4) a “full statement” of the reasons the child is being sent and the authority pursuant to which the proposed placement is being made.

A child may not be sent to a receiving state until the receiving state notifies the sending state that the placement is in the best interests of the child. In order to make this determination, once notice of the proposed interstate placement is received by the public authorities in the receiving state, the receiving state may request, and is entitled to receive, additional information necessary to carry out the purposes of the compact.

Finally, pursuant to the ICPC, the sending state must maintain jurisdiction until the child is adopted, reaches the age of majority, or the child protection case is closed with concurrence from the receiving state.

E. Timeframes

Under the Safe and Timely Interstate Placement of Foster Children Act of 2006, all states are required to have home studies completed and back to the sending state within 60
calendar days. Failure to do so could result in penalties for the state failing to complete
the home study within the timeframes. Permission to place continues to be valid for six
months.155

F. Special Cases

1. Regulation 1 – Intact Moves

a. Temporary moves

Regulation 1156 of the ICPC applies when a child is placed with a family and the
family plans to move to another state.157 Pursuant to the regulation, the child may
accompany the family to the new state (the receiving state). If the child will be in
the receiving state for 90 days or less, the receiving state has no obligations. The
sending state (the state from which the child moved) has the duty to ensure the
child’s safety while the child is in the receiving state. If the child will be
temporarily moving to the receiving state for more than 90 days, the sending state
must take action to ensure the safety of the child while in the receiving state,
including seeking return of the child if the receiving state requests that the child
return to the sending state. The receiving state must conduct a home study and
approve the child’s placement.

b. Provisional approvals

If the child moves to the receiving state prior to completing the ICPC process, the
sending state must, nonetheless, request that the receiving state respond to the
relocation within five days of its decision to send the child. The sending state
must provide required documentation to the receiving state. Upon request, the
receiving state must reply within five days and conduct a home study, which must
be completed within 60 days. During the transition, Regulation 1 provides that
the receiving state must honor the home study completed in the sending state until
it is able to complete its own evaluation.158

The procedure for provisional approval should be used sparingly. One of the
purposes of the ICPC is to ensure the sending state’s continuing authority over a

---

156 The Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (AAICPC) is an
interstate agency consisting of representatives from all 50 states that has the authority under the ICPC to
“promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of the compact.” See I.C. § 
16-2102 Art. VII (2009). The regulations adopted by AAICPC are available at:
157 INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, Reg. No. 1(3)(2010), available at
158 Id. at Reg. No. 1(5)-(6).
child under its exclusive jurisdiction. Sending a child to another state without the protection of an ICPC approval will make enforcement of the sending state’s court orders more difficult.

2. **Regulation 7 – Priority Cases Involving Placement with a Relative Only**

ICPC Regulation 7 provides for expedited handling of interstate placements with a relative under some circumstances. Pursuant to Regulation 7, a request can be made when the proposed placement is with a relative AND the child is under four years OR the child is in an emergency shelter OR the court finds the child has a substantial relationship with the proposed placement. Regulation 7 requires a court to make the specific finding just described in order to qualify for expedited handling.

* * *

---

159 *Id. at Reg. No. 7(6)(a).*

160 *Id.*
12.8 IDAHO JUVENILE RULE 40: INVOLVING CHILDREN AND FOSTER PARENTS IN COURT

Children and youth are the most important part of a child protection case, and making decisions based on the young person’s best interests requires her or his voice to be heard throughout the proceedings. Children and youth are often understandably frustrated when they are excluded from court proceedings in which their family relationships, physical safety, health, education, and where they will live are all at stake. With this fundamental idea in mind, Idaho Juvenile Rule 40 was enacted to give children and youth (and foster parents), after phase I of the Adjudicatory hearing the right to notice and the right to be heard at each subsequent stage of the proceedings.

IJR 40 requires that a foster parent, pre-adoptive parent, relative placement, and/or a child eight years of age or older, must be provided with notice of, and have a right to be heard in, any post-adjudicatory hearings to be held with respect to the child. This does not give foster parents, pre-adoptive parents, or relative placements the status of a party to the proceedings. The Department has the duty of providing notice to the individuals included in Rule 40 and must confirm to the court that notice was given. To further the policy of giving children a voice in the courtroom, the guardian ad litem appointed to the case has the duty of inquiring of any child capable of expressing her or his wishes and including the child’s express wishes in the report to the court.

Many judges and child welfare advocates have concluded that children should be present in court to have their voices heard in the proceedings. Many questions arise from both judges and practitioners on how to best involve children and youth in the proceedings and gain insights to aid decision making. One question that often arises concerns ex parte communications between the youth and judge. In State of Idaho v. Clouse, the court determined it was permissible for the judge to interview the child in chambers, with no record taken and where parents’ counsel was not permitted to cross-examine. The court applied the reasoning used in domestic relations cases. Considering both the Clouse decision and the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct, some best practice recommendations for interviewing the child or youth in chambers include:

- Getting parties’ consent to such an interview on the record
- Making a record of the interview
- If possible, having counsel (but not parents) present
- Having an advocate available to accompany the child
- Offering parties and/or counsel an opportunity to submit questions if either will not be present during the interview

---

161 William G. Jones, Making Youth a Meaningful Part of the Court Process, JUV. & FAM. JUSTICE TODAY 16 (Fall 2006).
162 I.J.R. 40(a),(b).
163 I.J.R. 40(a).
164 Id.
165 I.C. § 16-1633(2).
167 “A judge may not have ex parte communications concerning a pending proceeding with any party on any substantive matter.” IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANNON 3-(B)(7).
Another concern often voiced by judges and child welfare experts is that information discussed in court may be disturbing and upsetting to children and youth who attend the hearings. It is worth noting that children and youth are involved in court proceedings because of real-life events they have experienced. They have already been exposed to, and survived, the harsh realities ultimately discussed in court. If certain parts of the proceeding are unusually upsetting, the child or youth can be excluded for that part of the hearing. Participation allows the child or youth to hear how the parent has progressed in meeting requirements and to have a better ability to come to terms with what the court orders.\footnote{168} If children or youth are excluded for part of the hearing, best practice is to allow them to return at the conclusion of the hearing so that they are available to hear the outcome of the hearing.

Finally, concerns arise over disruptions in the child’s or youth’s schedule to attend court hearings. The judge can alleviate some of this concern by scheduling hearing times so child or youth miss the least amount of school possible. Ensure the hearings are scheduled before or after school hours or on school holidays. The judge can also ensure that when youth are present, he or she hears those cases first.

While the child or youth is in court, the role of the judge, attorneys, and child welfare workers is twofold: to make the experience a positive one, and to gain as much relevant information about the child and family as possible.\footnote{169} The following best practice tips accomplish both tasks:

- Arrange for or allow children or youth to have a support person present if they desire.
- Provide age-appropriate reading material describing the court process to the child or youth and a list of some legal terms and definitions that may be used during the hearing.
- Address the child or youth directly using a supportive voice and making eye contact.
- Explain your role to the child or youth and explain what issues you can address.
- Avoid acronyms or legal jargon that a child or youth would not understand.\footnote{170}

Most importantly, take the time to prepare for a child’s or youth’s involvement using proper language, asking good questions, and talking about the right issues.

When children and youth have a voice in court and the opportunity to participate in the critical processes that profoundly impact their lives, the entire system benefits from better-informed decision-making. Whether the child or youth attends a hearing, or the social worker, guardian \textit{ad litem}, or child’s attorney informs the court of the child’s or youth’s wishes, the child or youth has the chance to be heard and to make an impact on some of the most important decisions in her/his life.

\* \* \*

\footnote{170} Andrea Khoury, \textit{With Me, Not Without Me: How to Involve Children in Court}, A.B.A. Child L. Practice, Nov. 2007.
12.9 EDUCATIONAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN

"Our greatest natural resource is the minds of our children." – Walt Disney

A. Overview

When children come into care for abuse, neglect, abandonment, or unstable homes, it is almost certain that their education has been harmed in some way by the action or inaction of their parents. Studies have confirmed this fact.\(^{171}\)

Research indicates that “[e]ach year, an estimated 400,000–440,000 infants (10–11% of all births) are affected by prenatal alcohol or illicit drug exposure. Prenatal exposure to alcohol, tobacco, and illicit drugs has the potential to cause a wide spectrum of physical, emotional, and developmental problems for these infants. The harm caused to the child can be significant and long-lasting, especially if the exposure is not detected and the effects are not treated as soon as possible.”\(^{172}\) Exposure to maltreatment as a child is especially detrimental in the context of education. Children’s “brains are developing at life-altering rates of speed. Maltreatment chemically alters that development and can lead to permanent damage to the brains architecture. Every year, 196,476 children from birth to 3 years old come into contact with the child welfare system.”\(^{173}\)

Other issues in the home, such as tobacco use, have also been linked to cognitive problems for children:

The effects of prenatal tobacco exposure are particularly concerning because so many expectant mothers smoke---by one estimate, over 10 percent in the United States. In utero exposure to tobacco byproducts had been linked to cognitive deficits in laboratory animals and human adolescents. Some studies suggest that such exposure can lower general intelligence; for example, one found a 12-point gap in full scale IQ between exposed and unexposed middle-class adolescents. In another study, the odds of having attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) were more than three times as great for adolescents whose mothers smoked during pregnancy compared with children of nonsmoking mothers.\(^{174}\)

---


Studies report that up to 47% of children and youth in foster care receive special education services at some time in their schooling.\footnote{175}

Medicaid pays for 37% of births nationally and well above that level in several states. The good news is that interventions at birth for substance-exposed infants can remedy much of the harm and have the children ready for success when entering school. The bad news is that few states pay for or provide these expensive comprehensive services and parents in poverty are not always well equipped to access existing services or advocate for their children. The best option is prevention. Healthcare providers that take the time to educate expectant mothers see significant reductions in prenatal substance abuse. Early intervention for substance-exposed infants can also prevent a lifetime of expensive services and costs to the criminal justice system.\footnote{176}

“From the moment of conception to the initial, tentative step into a kindergarten classroom, early childhood development takes place at a rate that exceeds any other stage of life. The capacity to learn and absorb is simply astonishing in these first years of life. What impact does childcare have on a child’s development? What lasting toll does family stress have on a child? What are the most important known influences on early brain development? Can early interventions alter the course of early development for the better? The conclusions and recommendations are very specific and derived from a rich and extensive knowledge base firmly grounded in four core themes:

1. All children are born wired for feelings and ready to learn.
2. Early environments matter and nurturing relationships are essential.
3. Society is changing and the needs of young children are not being addressed.
4. Interactions among early childhood science, policy, and practice are problematic and demand rethinking.”\footnote{177}

\section*{B. Legal Framework for Assessing Educational Needs}

\subsection*{1. Federal Law}

In response to the clear data of a failed system in regards to educational needs of foster children, the federal government has responded with legislation designed to motivate local jurisdictions. These include:

a. The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008.\footnote{178} (Fostering Connections) This act places the responsibility on local child welfare agencies to collaborate with local school districts for the educational success of foster children. Reimbursement (part of IV-E funding going to the Department)
helps pay for transportation to keep foster children in their original school when appropriate.

b. The McKinney Vento Homeless Assistance Act (McKinney Vento). This act forces action by local school districts to support educational efforts of the Department with the threat of loss of federal funds for non-action.

Of the two laws, Fostering Connections is far more comprehensive and implemented by state child welfare agencies. McKinney Vento directs the efforts of local school districts, and the districts are responsible for the cost of implementation. On the issue of who pays the cost of meeting children’s special needs – the child welfare agency or the schools – the courts can bring the parties together in a comprehensive manner. The case plan must include “an assurance that the state [or local child welfare agency] has coordinated with appropriate local education agencies … to ensure that the child remains enrolled in the school in which the child was enrolled at the time of placement” unless moving is in the child’s best interest.

Unique challenges exist in Idaho because of differences in the size and resources available in school districts around the state. For some children, it may be helpful to move the child to a county where needed services are available. If this option is considered, care should be taken to look at the transferability of any existing or needed “Individual Education Program” (IEP) plans. The latest version of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA 2004) made parents of children with special needs even more crucial members of their child's education team. Parents can now work with educators to develop an IEP. The IEP describes the goals the team sets for a child during the school year, as well as any special support needed to help achieve them. The plan should address who is to act in the role of parent and interact with the school on educational issues -- the foster parents, the caseworker, or a specially assigned educational advocate. The child’s case plan must include “assurances that the placement of a child in foster care takes into account the appropriateness of the current educational setting and proximity to the school in which the child is enrolled at the time of placement.”

C. Idaho Law

Idaho has responded to the educational needs of children by amending the definition of neglect in the CPA. It now provides:

(26) "Neglected" means a child:
(d) Who is without proper education because of the failure to comply with section 33-202, Idaho Code [mandatory school attendance].

---

181 Id.
Idaho statutes relating to education provide guidance on what constitutes a “proper education.” For example, the state compulsory school attendance law provides:

The parent or guardian of any child resident in this state who has attained the age of seven (7) years at the time of the commencement of school in his district, but not the age of sixteen (16) years, shall cause the child to be instructed in subjects commonly and usually taught in the public schools of the state of Idaho. To accomplish this, a parent or guardian shall either cause the child to be privately instructed by, or at the direction of, his parent or guardian; or enrolled in a public school or public charter school, including an on-line or virtual charter school or private or parochial school during a period in each year equal to that in which the public schools are in session; there to conform to the attendance policies and regulations established by the board of trustees, or other governing body, operating the school attended.183

In addition, Idaho Code section 16-1621(3)(a) regarding the case plan hearing requires that the child’s educational needs be met by the case plan. Section 16-1621(3)(a) and (b) requires that the case plan identify services to be provided including services to: (a)…meet any special educational, emotional, physical, or developmental needs the child may have, to assist the child in adjusting to the placement, or to ensure the stability of the placement; (b) address options for maintaining the child’s connection to the community, including individuals with a significant relationship to this child, and organizations or community activities with who the child has a significant connection”184

D. Issues for Social Workers Regarding Education Needs of Children

The child protection system can appear to require social workers to manage a child’s situation in inconsistent ways. For example, the CPA’s concurrent planning requirement means that caseworkers must to seek to reunify the child with the parents and, at the same time, plan for failure by developing a permanency plan if reunification is not timely. Educational mandates described above can raise similar conflicts – should a social worker keep a child in his home school or place the child in a foster placement that will require the child to be in a different school district or even state?

Social workers are trained to evaluate cases by focusing on an escalating ladder of risk assessment, starting at addressing immediate safety issues and escalating through imminent risk, risk of harm, imminent risk of severe harm, immediate physical danger, threat of harm, and finally, threat of imminent harm.185 It is not always obvious how the child’s educational needs fit into this type of assessment. It is not likely that the Department will pursue many CPA cases simply based on educational neglect. Yet, a child with unmet educational needs may face many future obstacles. Nonetheless, educational issues are more likely to surface through truancy charges in juvenile court or charges against the parents rather than through a CPA case.

184 I.C. § 16-1621 (a) and (b).
Social workers making school stability determinations need to document and justify their actions to the court in review hearings. Best practice is to answer these questions in the Department’s reports to the court:

1. How was the best interest determination made for the child’s school selection?
2. Who made the best interest decision?
3. What role did the parents play in making these decisions?
4. If there were disputes how were they resolved?
5. How did the Department and the school district collaborate?
6. How long is the child’s current placement expected to last?
7. How many schools has the child attended this year? The past few years?
8. How strong is the child academically?
9. What is the availability of programs and activities at the different school options?
10. Which school does the student prefer?
11. How deep are the child’s ties to the school?
12. How was the timing of a transfer decided? End of year or testing timing?
13. How did changing schools affect the student’s ability to earn full credits, participate in sports or extra-curricular activities, or graduate on time?
14. How does the length of the commute to the school of origin impact the child?
15. What school do the child’s siblings attend?
16. Are there any safety issues to consider?186

E. Suggested Questions for Judges to Assess a Child’s Educational Needs

Throughout the planning process, the court should assure that all of the educational needs of the child are being addressed. In protective supervision cases and in cases progressing towards reunification, focus must be placed on the caregivers learning about the importance of education, about how to help their child succeed in school, and about how to advocate for the educational needs of their child.

As a matter of best practice, judges should read the reports provided by the Department and the guardian *ad litem*. The new reports provided to the courts in Idaho have space dedicated to answering many of the educational questions a judge may have.

A team effort between the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Casey Family Programs, and Team Child Advocacy for Youth developed a technical assistance brief in 2005 for the use of judges and others entitled “Asking the Right Questions.”187 It provides judicial checklists to ensure that the educational needs of children and youth in foster care are

---


being addressed. As a matter of best practice, judges, practitioners, and social workers are encouraged to use the extensive checklists found in the judicial bench cards, which compliment this manual.

* * *

CURRENT UPDATES CAN BE FOUND ONLINE AT: ISC.IDAHO.GOV/CHILD-PROTECTION/RESOURCE  LAST REVISED: MAY, 2018
12.10 TRANSITION to SUCCESSFUL ADULTHOOD\textsuperscript{188}

On any given day, more than 463,000 children and youth are in out-of-home care across the United States.\textsuperscript{189} Of these children, an estimated 39\% were identified as being 13 years of age or older\textsuperscript{190} and more than 29,000 of these youth reach an age at which they must make the transition out of the child welfare system, whether or not they possess the skills and support necessary to live successfully on their own.\textsuperscript{191} Youth who have experienced abuse, neglect, and other circumstances resulting in out-of-home placement often need additional resources to reach their full potential after leaving the child welfare system.

Independent Living services are intended to mitigate negative outcomes for former foster youth and enhance their chances for success as adults. The services provided by Idaho’s Independent Living Program support older youth in foster care and assist them in developing the skills they need to live as responsible and successful adults.\textsuperscript{192} Recognizing the unique challenges of older youth who have lived in foster care, the federal government established the Chafee Foster Care Independence Program and appropriated funds to states to assure a minimum level of preparation for independent living for older youth who have been in foster care.\textsuperscript{193}

Effective September 15, 2015, the federal Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act requires that for youth age 14 and over:

- The case plan must document the youth’s education, health, visitation, and court participation rights, as well as the child’s right to receive an annual credit report. The case plan must include a signed acknowledgement that these rights were explained to the youth in a developmentally appropriate way and that the youth received these services.\textsuperscript{194}
- The youth must be involved in, and consulted regarding, the development of the case plan. At the option of the youth, the case planning team must include two members who are not the caseworker and the foster parent.\textsuperscript{195}
- At the case plan and permanency hearings, the services to help youth transition to successful adulthood must be described.\textsuperscript{196}

\textsuperscript{188} The Department is in the process of transitioning from the use of “Independent Living” to “Transition to Successful Adulthood.”
\textsuperscript{190} U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE ANALYSIS AND REPORTING SYSTEM REPORT 2007.
\textsuperscript{191} U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE ANALYSIS AND REPORTING SYSTEM REPORT 2008.
\textsuperscript{194} Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 675A(1)(b), §675(1).
\textsuperscript{195} 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(B), (5)(C)(iv).
\textsuperscript{196} 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(D), (5)(C)(i).
The goals of Idaho’s Independent Living program are to achieve the goals of the Chafee Act:\textsuperscript{197}
2. Help youth receive the education, training, and services necessary to obtain employment.
3. Help youth prepare for and enter postsecondary training and education institutions.
4. Provide personal and emotional support to youth aging out of foster care through mentors and the promotion of interactions with dedicated adults.
5. Provide financial, housing, counseling, employment, education and other appropriate support and services to former foster care recipients between 18 and 21 years of age to complement their own efforts to achieve self-sufficiency.
6. Assure that program participants recognize and accept their personal responsibility for preparing for and then making the transition into adulthood.
7. Make available vouchers for education and training, including postsecondary education, to youth who have aged out of foster care.
8. Provide services to youth who, after attaining 16 years of age, have left foster care for kinship guardianship or adoption.\textsuperscript{198}

To be eligible for Independent Living Services in Idaho, youth must meet all of the following criteria:
- be, or have been, the responsibility of the state or an Indian tribe either through a court order or voluntary placement agreement with the child’s family,
- be between the ages of 14 and 21 years,
- resided in an eligible placement setting which includes foster care, group care, Indian boarding school, or similar foster care placement and excludes inpatient hospital stays, detention facilities, forestry camps, or other settings primarily designed for services to delinquent youth, and
- have resided in an eligible foster care setting for 90 cumulative days after the 14th birthday.

Every youth, 14 years of age or older and in the custody of IDHW, must have an individualized Independent Living (IL) Plan that includes a permanency plan and independent living skill development and is updated at least annually. For a youth who has attained 14 years of age, the permanency plan approved by the court must include the services needed to assist the youth to make the transition from foster care to successful adulthood.\textsuperscript{199} Idaho law requires that at permanency hearings for youth who are 14 or older, a determination of the services needed to assist the youth to make the transition from foster care to successful adulthood must be identified.\textsuperscript{200}

\textsuperscript{197} Id.
\textsuperscript{198} 42 U.S.C. § 677(a).
\textsuperscript{199} I.C. § 16-1621(3)(d)(vii).
\textsuperscript{200} I. C. § 16-1622(2)(e); see also 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(D).
Independent Living planning continues at 17 and 18, but formal transition planning is added at age 17 to assure that youth are prepared to move into independent living at age 18. Transition planning includes assessing the youth’s readiness, resources, and skills and providing individualized services to prepare each youth to live as independently as possible after leaving care.

No earlier than 60 days before and no later than 60 days after the youth’s 17th birthday, a transition planning meeting must be held. Transition planning participants include the youth for whom the plan is being developed, foster parents, biological parent(s) and family when appropriate, youth mentors, educators, service providers, and others requested by the youth or specific to the youth’s needs. The plan should provide for a stable transition and support network for the youth during the transition period and following the exit from care. The Transition Plan is part of the youth’s IL Plan and is required at two points, when the youth in care turns 17 and when the youth is within 90 days of aging out of care.201

The Fostering Connections to Success and Adoption Assistance Act of 2008 requires a Transition Plan be completed during the 90-day period immediately prior to a youth’s 18th birthday or when the youth ages out of care.202 This plan must be “personalized at the direction of the youth.” Within those 90 days, the IL Transition Plan developed must be reviewed and updated to ensure that the final IL Transition Plan reflects the current status and needs of the youth.

A youth who has a final IL transition plan must be given information about the importance of designating another individual to make health care treatment decisions on behalf of the youth if the youth becomes unable to participate in such decisions and the youth does not have, or does not want, a relative who would otherwise be authorized under State law to make such decisions.203 The final IL transition plan provides the child with the option to execute a health care power of attorney, health care proxy, or other similar document recognized under State law.

Before youth age out of foster care, they are to be given a Health and Education Passport. The passport should include the following documents:

- Birth Certificate
- Social Security Card
- Immunization Record: Complete and up to date
- Health Records and Medical Card: Allergies, hospitalizations, treatments, medications, list of all past medical exams with any diagnoses or childhood diseases
- Medical Insurance Card
- Driver’s License or State-Issued Identification Card

203 Id.
- Information about the importance of designating another individual to make health care treatment decisions on behalf of the youth if he/she is unable to participate in such decisions, specifically as found in Idaho’s Living Wills and Idaho’s Natural Death Act
- Education Record: Past and present schools attended, report cards, IEP’s, transcripts, letters of achievement
- Independent Living Plan: Most recent Independent Living Transition Plan
- Letter of Verification of Dependency in the State of Idaho: Letter of verification, which establishes eligibility for future IL services and enables the youth to receive IL services from another state if they leave Idaho
- Permanency Pact: Developed before the youth leaves care
- Education and Training Voucher (ETV) information
- State and regional resource guides, as available\textsuperscript{204}

When the state fails to connect youth to a permanent legal family, youth struggle to create their own family or support network to meet legal, emotional, psychological, and cultural needs. Youth who age out of the system are less likely than their peers in the general population to achieve academic milestones, and find employment opportunities. They are more likely to experience violence, homelessness, mental illness, and poor health outcomes.\textsuperscript{205} Independent living advocacy in the courtroom at each hearing, collaboration between all the child welfare participants, and close monitoring of the youth’s independent living needs will ensure that the youths’ needs are being met and that youth receive the supports they need for future stability and success.

\textsuperscript{204} CFSP Report, supra note 196, at 27.
12.11 GUARDIANSHIPS

A. Introduction

When considering permanency options for a child, the Department and the court must take into account the permanency priorities set forth in federal law. These federal permanency priorities are also embedded in the CPA. They favor permanency options that maximize long term permanency and stability for the child. The highest priority permanency goal is to reunify the child with her or his parents. If the CPA court determines that reunification is not an appropriate goal the next highest priority is termination of parental rights and adoption. Guardianship is the third priority permanency goal. If these three permanency goals are not available, the child may be placed in another planned permanent living arrangement (APPLA). APPLA is only available as a placement option for a youth 16 years or older.

B. Role of the Guardian

The objective for guardianship in the child protection context is to make the placement as permanent as possible even though the child is not being reunified with parents or adopted. The guardian will be undertaking a responsibility that is intended to be as close to adoption as possible, subject only to the rights that are reserved to the parents under the guardianship statute or in the order appointing the guardian(s). Idaho law imposes a higher standard to modify or terminate a guardianship that is connected to a child protection case. The best practice is for the court to ensure, through careful inquiry, that both the parents and the guardian understand that upon appointment, the “guardian has the rights and responsibilities of a parent upon being appointed, and a guardian in her or his discretion has the authority to have the custody of the ward and to determine with whom and under what conditions the ward can visit others.”

C. Requirements for a Guardianship

The Idaho Guardianship of Minors Statute (IGMS) provides that a court may appoint a guardian under two circumstances. First, a guardian can be appointed if “all parental rights of custody” have been terminated by a prior court order. This ground is not generally used in child protection situations. Where parental rights have been terminated in the child protection context, adoption is the preferred permanency option. A guardianship may also be appointed “upon a

---

206 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B). Cite to the CFR, also
207 I.C. § 16-1622(2)
208 See Chapter 7 of this manual for a detailed discussion of APPLA.
210 I.C. § 15-5-212(5) & (6).
211 Doe, 160 Idaho at 313, 372 P. 3d at 368.
212 I.C. § 15-5-204
finding that the child has been neglected, abused, abandoned, or whose parents are unable to provide a stable home environment.”

The IGMS does not define “abused,” “neglected” or “unstable home environment.” The statute provides that “abandoned” means “the failure of the parent to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child including, but not limited to, reasonable support or regular contact.” The IGMS further provides that the failure to maintain such a relationship for a period of six months is prima facie evidence of abandonment.

In every guardianship case, the IGMS requires that the court must consider the best interests of the child as the “primary factor” in deciding whether to appoint a guardian.

**D. Information in the Permanency Plan**

Although not expressly required by the CPA, the permanency plan should name the proposed guardians when known. The CPA imposes such a requirement when the permanency plan is termination and adoption. Including such information in the permanency plan helps establish a link between the child protection action and the adoption action. For similar reasons the best practice recommendation is that the proposed guardians also be identified in the permanency plan when guardianship is proposed as the permanency goal.

**E. Advantages and Disadvantages of Guardianship as a Permanency Goal**

In limited circumstances, guardianship can be a better permanency goal for a child than termination of parental rights and adoption.

- Guardianship may be in the best interests of a child because it does not affect the child’s right to financial benefits from or through the parents, such as child support, inheritance, veterans’ benefits, or Social Security.
- A guardianship may be a more acceptable permanency goal for an older child who objects to adoption.
- A child’s best interests may be served by a potential guardian who is willing to take on the challenge of raising a child but not willing to take the risk of financial responsibility for the child’s negligent or criminal actions.
- A child’s best interests may be served by a relative who is committed to providing the child with parental care, but may not be willing to become an adoptive parent.
- A guardianship is more flexible than adoption. For example, when it is in the best interest of the child, the order appointing the guardian can include provisions that allow the child to have continuing contact with either or both parents.

---

213 *Id.*
214 *Id.*
215 *Id.*
216 I.C. § 16-1622 requires “if the permanency goal is termination of parental rights and adoption, then . . . the permanency plan shall also name the proposed adoptive parents when known. . . .”
217 I.C. § 15-5-209
Guardianships can be modified if circumstances change.

Guardianship offers the possibility of an agreed-upon solution that has active support of all the parties and minimizes conflict among people who will have a significant ongoing role in the child’s life.

Guardianship also has disadvantages:

- Despite provisions of Idaho law intended to make CPA-connected guardianships as permanent as possible, guardianships may be modified or terminated during the child’s minority. For example, parents may seek to end the guardianship without having resolved the issues that endangered the child. For this reason it is crucial that there be a detailed plan to ensure that the placement will be stable.

- Guardianships terminate when the children reaches majority. This may mean that a young adult has no “permanent family” for support.

- Independent living benefits, subsequent to the passage of Family First Prevention Services Act, will be available to “youth age 14 and older who have experienced foster care”. Guidance regarding the use of Chafee Independent Living funds for youth regardless of their exit process is expected in the near future. Previously, a youth was eligible for independent living benefits if the youth exited care through guardianship, provided that the guardianship occurred after the youth’s 16th birthday.

- APPLA benefits are only available to kids who exit care when turning 18, not when they exit through adoption or guardianship.

- Guardianships are subject to ongoing monitoring by the court until the guardianship is terminated by court order or the minor reaches the age of majority. Despite this continuing responsibility to monitor the case, the services and resources provided by the Department are no longer available when the child protection case is closed.

- Some types of insurance benefits may not apply to children in a guardianship.

- The court’s powers are less extensive in a guardianship case than in a child protection case: “[t]he court has the authority to appoint the guardian and to remove the guardian, but not to manage how the guardian exercises her or his powers and responsibilities.”

F. Procedural Considerations in a CP Connected Guardianship

1. Jurisdiction

The IGMS provides a specific process for guardianships that arise when a minor is under the jurisdiction of a court in a CP case or where a guardianship arises in connection with a permanency plan for a minor who was the subject of a proceeding under the CPA. The CPA court has exclusive jurisdiction and venue over any related guardianship proceeding unless the CPA court declines jurisdiction. The Child Protective Act imposes an ongoing duty on the

---

218 P.L. 15-123
219 The federal Families First legislation changed the independent living qualification from “youth who are likely to age out of care” to “youth age 14 and older who have experienced foster care.” At the writing of this manual in May 2018, IDHW anticipates new guidance from the federal government about utilizing independent living funds for youth regardless of their exit reason. See 4 U.S.C. §677.
221 I.C. § 15-5-212A(1)
parties to a CPA case to “inquire concerning, and inform the court as soon as possible about, any other pending actions or current orders involving the child.” The CPA further provides that “[i]n the event there are conflicting orders from Idaho courts concerning the child, the child protection order is controlling.” The IGMS contemplates, and best practice is, that judges in competing actions in or out of state consult as to the appropriate jurisdiction, keeping in mind the best interest of the child, including the safety needs of the child.

2. **Role of the Department**

The IGMS provides that notice of any action regarding a guardianship arising under the CPA must be provided to the Department, which has the right to appear and be heard in any hearing and which may intervene as a party in the action. Furthermore, the guardian may not consent to adoption of the child without prior notice to the Department.

3. **Notice**

The IGMS provides that, in addition to notifying the Department, notice of the time and place of the hearing on a guardianship petition must be provided to: a) the child if he or she is over 14; b) the person who had the principal care and custody of the minor for the 60 days preceding the date of the petition; c) any de facto custodian under Idaho Code § 15-5-213; and d) any living parent of the child. Regarding “living parents,” the statute further provides that the court may waive notice under two circumstances. The first is where a living father of the child was never married to the mother of the child and has failed to “register his paternity as provided in 16-1504(4), Idaho Code.” The court also may waive notice to a living father where it “has been shown to … [the court’s] satisfaction circumstances that would allow the entry of an order of termination of parental rights . . . even though termination of parental rights is not being sought as to such father.”

4. **Appointment of Counsel and Guardian ad Litem**

The IGMS does not provide for appointment of counsel for parents or for the prospective guardian in a guardianship proceeding. Because the guardianship proceeding is a new proceeding counsel appointed for parents in the CPA proceeding cannot represent them in the guardianship proceeding.

The child may have the right to appointed counsel or to appointment of a guardian *ad litem* in a guardianship proceeding. Idaho Code §15-5-207 states: “The court shall appoint an attorney to represent the minor if the court determines that the minor possesses sufficient maturity to direct...
the attorney. If the court finds that the minor is not mature enough to direct an attorney, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor. The court may decline to appoint an attorney or guardian ad litem if it finds in writing that such appointment is not necessary to serve the best interests of the minor.” The best practice is to appoint the same attorney and/or guardian ad litem who represented the child in the child protection case to serve in the same role in the guardianship proceeding. A child who is the subject of a guardianship proceeding has the right to object to a proposed guardian and will need legal help to follow the statutory process making the objection. 230

5. Modification and Termination of CP Connected Guardianship

The IGMS imposes a higher standard for termination of a guardianship connected to a CPA case. The moving party in a proceeding for modification, termination or removal of a guardian has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that there has been a substantial and material change in the circumstances of the parent or the minor since the establishment of the guardianship and that termination of the guardianship would be in the best interests of the minor. 231 Nonetheless, it is easier for a guardian to withdraw from their responsibilities compared with adoptive parents. There have been instances in which guardians have returned the child to her or his parents, or left the child with others. Although such actions do not terminate the guardianship, 232 the situation often does not come to the attention of the court. The formal procedure for resignation is set out in Idaho Code § 15-5-212. An older child, age 12 in the Child Protective Act and age 14 under this section, should be represented by an attorney. Death, incapacity, or resignation of a guardian can require immediate difficult decisions and action by the court.

G. Guardianship Assistance

For children in foster care, guardianship assistance may be available in specific circumstances under both federal and state law. 233

IV-E Guardianship Assistance may be available to a relative guardian for the support of a child who is fourteen (14) years of age or older, who without guardianship assistance, would remain in the legal custody of the Department. In cases of multiple children the amount of guardianship assistance may be less than that available under adoption assistance.

230 See I.C. § 15-5-203 regarding the child’s right to object to the guardian.

231 I.C. § 15-5-212A(5) & (6)

232 See I.C. § 15-5-210 (resignation of a guardian without the appointment of a successor guardian does not terminate the guardianship until it has been approved by the court.)

State Guardianship Assistance may be available to a legal guardian for the support of a child if the parental rights have been terminated and there are documented unsuccessful efforts to place the child for adoption.

The subsidies that are available to assist adoptive families and special needs children in the case of adoption are not usually available in guardianships.

The services of the Department and the guardian *ad litem* are not available to monitor the child’s welfare while in the care of the guardian or to find a new placement for the child if the guardian resigns, both of which may be necessary in some circumstances. Services may not be available to assist the guardian or the child, except to the extent the guardian or child qualifies under other programs independent of the CPA proceedings. In some cases, such services may be appropriate or necessary to ensure the success of the placement, particularly where the child has special needs and the guardian has limited resources.

**H. Temporary Guardianship**

The IGMS allows for appointment of temporary guardian(s). In some instances the Department asks for termination of the child protection case once a temporary appointment is made. In such situations, the CPA court must determine if the temporary appointment is “permanent” enough to allow for closing of the child protection case before the guardianship is finalized.

---

234 See I.C. § 15-5-207