

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 40459/40460

STATE OF IDAHO,	)	2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 695
	)	
<b>Plaintiff-Respondent,</b>	)	<b>Filed: October 3, 2013</b>
	)	
v.	)	<b>Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk</b>
	)	
TREVA DAWN IRVING, aka HERREN,	)	<b>THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED</b>
	)	<b>OPINION AND SHALL NOT</b>
<b>Defendant-Appellant.</b>	)	<b>BE CITED AS AUTHORITY</b>
	)	

---

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge.

Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified seven-year sentence with two-year determinate term for driving under the influence, affirmed; order revoking probation and requiring execution of concurrent unified eight-year sentence with two and one-half-years determinate term for grand theft, affirmed; order denying I.C.R. 35 motion, affirmed.

Stephen D. Thompson, Ketchum, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

---

Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; GRATTON, Judge;  
and MELANSON, Judge

---

PER CURIAM

In these consolidated appeals, Treva Dawn Irving pled guilty to driving under the influence (docket number 40459). Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(5). The district court imposed a unified seven-year sentence with a two-year determinate term, but suspended the sentence and placed Irving on probation. Subsequently, Irving was found to have violated several terms of her probation, resulting in her pleading guilty to grand theft (docket number 40460). I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1)(b). The district court imposed a concurrent unified sentence of eight years with two and one-half years determinate, and retained jurisdiction in both the DUI and grand theft cases. Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court

suspended both of her sentences and reinstated probation. Subsequently, Irving admitted to violating several terms of her probation, and the district court executed the suspended sentences. Irving timely filed Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motions requesting a reduction in her sentences, which the district court denied. Irving appeals, asserting that the district court abused its discretion by revoking her probation, by imposing excessive sentences, and by denying her Rule 35 motions.

It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; *State v. Beckett*, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); *State v. Adams*, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); *State v. Hass*, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. *State v. Upton*, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; *Hass*, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; *State v. Marks*, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. *State v. Urrabazo*, 150 Idaho 158, 162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2010). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation. *State v. Morgan*, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record on appeal and are relevant to the defendant's contention that the trial court should have reduced the sentence sua sponte upon revocation of probation. *Id.*

Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. See *State v. Hernandez*, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); *State v. Lopez*, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); *State v. Toohill*, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).

When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. *State v. Oliver*, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. *State v. Hanington*, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of the probation. *Id.*

A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. *State v. Knighton*, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006); *State v. Allbee*, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion. *State v. Huffman*, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information. *Id.* Because no new or additional information in support of Irving's Rule 35 motions were presented, the district court did not abuse its discretion.

Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the records in these cases, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering execution of Irving's original sentences without modification. Therefore, the orders revoking probation and directing execution of Irving's previously suspended sentences, and the orders denying I.C.R. 35 motions are affirmed.